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As  of  July  1,  1986,  13.5 percent of  the  debt  owed  by  North Dakota farmers  to
agricultural  lenders  in  the  state was  delinquent  ($466 million).  This  is  in
addition to  the  $342  million of  debt  that was  restructured for  either ongoing
or terminating operations between January 1,  1985,  and July  1, 1986.
Geographically, the  level  of  delinquent loans  is  highest in  the  Red River
Valley,  the  southeast, and oil-producing counties of  North Dakota.  These
estimates are based on  a  survey  of  all  private agricultural lenders in  North
Dakota.
Various state laws  designed to protect debtors,  some  of  which  are unique  to
North  Dakota,  delay  lenders from  collecting and disposing of  collateral
securing these loans.  The  total economic  impact of  these laws  on  creditors is
estimated to  be  $172.2 million statewide--$23.9 million due  to  collection
delays  before acquisition, $62.2  million due  to delays after acquisition, and
$60.4  million due  to  concessions associated with  negotiated settlements
whereby  lenders attempt  to avoid legal proceedings.  Also  included in  this
amount is  $25.7 million that creditors cannot collect due  to  the  lack  of
deficiency  judgments.
These  laws  also have  an economic impact  on  both  nondelinquent and delinquent
borrowers.  The  resulting economic  impact to nondelinquent farm  borrowers is
in  the  form  of higher interest rates (143  basis points)  and  lower capital
availability.  To  maintain profit margins and living standards as interest
rates rise, nondelinquent borrowers must  assume  riskier investments and
methods  of  production--increasing  the  likelihood of  their default and placing
the  remainder of  the creditor's portfolio at risk.  Repayment  delays were  not
found  to  change the  long-run financial viability of  delinquent borrowers.
These  borrowers do,  however,  temporarily benefit from a  delay  in  repayment as
long as the rate of  return to farm assets exceeds  the rate of interest on
debt.
The  results of  the  analysis lead to several conclusions.
o  North Dakota statutory laws  which  delay or permit partial repayment  of
indebtedness have  an  economic impact.
o  The  economic  impact of  statutory laws affecting credit is  not always  in
the  form  of  increased collection delays--creditors often  concede  more  in
negotiated settlements  since their initial bargaining position is  weakened.
o  Nondelinquent borrowers and other customers of  credit institutions are
impacted through higher fees and interest rates as well  as  reduced credit
availability.
o  The  economic  impact upon  a  delinquent borrower is  opposite and not
necessarily equal to  the  economic  impact upon  the creditor or
nondelinquent borrowers.
vo Delay  in  repayment  is  most  beneficial to  borrowers if  the  earnings
that arise during the  delay  exceed  the  level  of  forgone interest.
o  Legislation that permits partial repayment  of obligations benefits
defaulting borrowers.
o  The  impact on  society  is  negligible as long  as the productivity of
delinquent borrowers does  not differ significantly from that of farmers
who  purchase the  collateral.
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A  consequence  of  North  Dakota's  generally  depressed  farm  economy  has  been  an
increased  number  of  delinquent  loans  and  expanded  application  of  debtor/
creditor  law.  North  Dakota's  debtor/creditor  laws  that  define  the  rights  and
limitations  of  credit  institutions  after  default  by  a  debtor  are  similar
to  those  of  other  states.  However,  North  Dakota  statutes  also  include
several  unique  provisions.  For  example,  the  "anti-deficiency  judgment"
statute  limits  the  amount  a  creditor  may  collect after  foreclosing  a  real
estate  mortgage  that  does  not  satisfy  the  debt.  Consequently,  borrowers
fulfill  their  obligation  with  only  a  partial  repayment.  Another  law  is  the
"confiscatory  price"  statute  that  grants  state  courts  additional
discretionary  authority  to  delay  legal  proceedings  such  as  a  foreclosure.
Political  pressure  to  further  limit  the  rights  of  creditors  during  times  of
economic  recession  and  numerous  foreclosures  is  not  without  precedent.  Alston
(1984)  notes  farm  foreclosures  were  high  throughout  the  1920s  and  1930s  due  in
large  part  to  farmers'  having  to  make  mortgage  payments  fixed  in  nominal
dollars  while  their  earnings  were  declining.  In  response,  many  state
legislatures  sought  to  aid  farmers  by  enacting  laws  that  protected  delinquent
borrowers.
Legislative  proposals  during  the  1980s  to  protect  debtors  often  call  for
voluntary  or  mandatory  foreclosure  moratoriums,  programs  that  reduce  interest
rates,  efforts  to  delay  collection  by  creditors,  extensions  of  due  dates  for
payments,  or  reductions  in  the  amount  of  indebtedness.  For  example,  Minnesota
enacted  a  law  in  early  1986  that  redefines  and  generally  restricts  the  legal
remedies  of  creditors  by  requiring  mediation,  altering  redemption  procedures,
establishing  a  procedure  for  division  of  crops  being  grown  on  foreclosed  land,
and  increasing  the  homestead  exemption  (Minnesota  Statutes  1986,  Chap  398).
Another  example  is  the  recently  enacted  Chapter  12  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code
(P.L.  99-958),  which  allows  borrowers  to  reduce  their  repayment  obligation  to
the  value  of  the  collateral  securing  the  debt.
Regardless  of  the  details  of  such  programs,  the  result  is  either  a
postponement  of  the  debtor's  scheduled  payments  or  a  reduction  in  the  amount
owed.  The  economic  impact  upon  delinquent  borrowers  from  a  delay  in  repayment
or  a decrease  in  the  amount  owed  may  or  may  not  be  sufficient  to  permit
financial  recovery  of  the  business.  The  correlative  impact  on  credit
institutions  is  a decrease  in  income  and  the  value  of  their  assets  without  an
*Saxowsky  and  Gustafson  are  assistant  professors,  Ali  is  a  research
assistant,  and  Braaten  is  a  graduate  research  assistant  in  Agricultural
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offsetting  reduction  in  costs  or  liabilities.  The  institutions  respond  by
adjusting  their  fees  and  interest  rates,  as  well  as  altering  the  level  and
kind  of  services  they  provide.  Consequently,  their  customers  are  impacted  by
a  combination  of  rising  charges,  reduced  financial  services,  and  lower  capital
availability.  These  implications  are  recognized,  but  few  studies  have
quantified  the  concessions  granted  to  delinquent  borrowers  and  the  resulting
economic  impacts  on  lenders  and  nondelinquent  borrowers.
This  report  (1)  describes  the  economic  impact  of  North  Dakota  laws  that  permit
delayed  or  partial  repayment  of  agricultural  loans  and  (2)  estimates  the
costs  and  benefits  incurred  by  creditors  and  borrowers.  A model  which
quantifies  each  of  the  financial  transfers  was  developed  to  assess  these
economic  impacts.  Data  used  to  estimate  the  model  were  collected  from  a  survey
of  financial  institutions  that  offer  intermediate-  and  long-term  credit  to
North  Dakota  farmers.  The  methodology  was  used  to  analyze  current  laws,  but
it  also  can  be  extended  to  evaluate  proposed  legislation.  Only  existing  state
law  was  analyzed  because  details  of  legislative  proposals  are  unknown  and  vary
considerably.  The  emphasis  of  this  study  was  from  a historical  perspective
-- estimating  the  economic  impacts  of  statutory  law  as  of  July  1,  1986.
There  are  five  parts  to  this  report.  The  first is  a review  of  state  laws
that permit  delayed  or  partial  repayment  of  debt  obligations.  The  second
part  describes  a  model  for  estimating  the  economic  impact  of  these  laws.  The
third  section  details  the  economic  costs  to  credit  institutions  as  estimated
by  the  model.  The  fourth  part  discusses  the  economic  impact  on  borrowers  and
consequences  for  future  lending  standards.  The  final  section  briefly  reviews
some  implications  for  legislation that  delays  or  permits  partial  debt
repayment.
State  Laws  that  Influence  Timing  of  Debt  Repayment
Creditors  have  several  alternatives  when  a debtor  defaults  on  a loan  payment.
Renegotiating  terms  of  the  loan  or  taking  no  action  are  two  alternatives  for  a
creditor.  A third  alternative  is  to  commence  legal  action  to  collect  the
unpaid  obligation.  The  procedure  for  enforcing  a loan  obligation  is  set forth
in  state  law  and  varies  depending  on  whether  the  creditor  is  secured  or
unsecured  and  whether  the  collateral  is  personal  property  or  real  property.
This  section  overviews  North  Dakota's  legal  procedure  for  enforcing  secured
debts.  The  emphasis  is  upon  secured  debt  because  the  laws  being  analyzed  have
minimal  implications  for  unsecured  obligations.  Therefore,  the  process  of
collecting  an  unsecured  debt  is  explained  only  to  the  extent  it  is  necessary
for  an  understanding  of  how  secured  obligations  are  enforced.
Creditors  are  not  necessarily  limited  to  a  single  legal  procedure  when
enforcing  a lien  upon  personal  property.  One  procedure  a creditor  can  follow
is  to  foreclose  the  lien  with  a  process  similar  to  foreclosure  of  a  real
estate  mortgage.  An  alternative  is  to  use  the  "self-help"  remedies  set forth
in  Article  9  of  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code.  The  "self-help"  remedies  are
generally  considered  less  expensive  as  well  as  more  expedient  and  usually  are
followed  rather  than  foreclosure.  Both  alternatives  are  discussed  in  this-3  -
section.  Foreclosure  of  personal  property  is  explained  as  part  of  the
discussion  on  real  estate  foreclosure,  while  the  Article  9  remedies  are
addressed  in  a  separate  section.  The  process  of  foreclosing  a  lien  on
personal  property  and  real  estate  is  explained  first.
The  length  of  time  between  default  and  when  a  creditor  receives  the  proceeds
from  the  sale  of  the  collateral  is  a  major  consideration  in  analyzing  the
economic  impact  of  state  legislation.  The  following  section will  not  only
explain  the  legal  procedure  undertaken  but  also  note  the  time  requirements
that  are  specified  in  the  law.  Some  of  the  time  requirements  apply  to  all
legal  actions,  but  others  are  relevant  only  to  legal  actions  involving
enforcement  of  an  indebtedness.
Foreclosure
The  initial  step  for  a  creditor  seeking  foreclosure  is  to  commence  a  lawsuit
on  the  basis  that  terms  of  a  note  have  been  violated  by  failure  of  the  debtor
to  complete  payments  in  a  timely  manner.  A creditor  commences  suit  by  filing
a  summons  and  complaint  at  the  county  courthouse  and  delivering  a  copy  of  the
filing  to  the  debtor.  North  Dakota  law  requires,  however,  that  a  creditor
provide  a  "Notice  of  Intent  to  Foreclose"  to  the  debtor  before  a  summons  and
complaint  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on  real  estate  can  be  filed  (North  Dakota
Century  Code  (N.D.C.C.)  32-19-20).  Such  notice  is  not  required  before  filing
suit  to  foreclose  a  lien  upon  personal  property.
A  "Notice  of  Intent  to  Foreclose"  upon  real  property  has  to  be  provided  30  to
90  days  before  the  lawsuit  is  commenced.  Content  of  the  notice  must  include  a
legal  description  of  the  real  estate;  the  date  and  amount  of  the  mortgage;  the
amount  owed  to  the  creditor  for  principal,  interest,  and  property  taxes;  and  a
statement  that  foreclosure  proceedings  will  be  commenced  if  the  amount  due  is
not  paid  within  30  days.  Requiring  creditors  to  provide  a  "Notice  of  Intent
to  Foreclose"  is  an  example  of  North  Dakota  law  that  only  pertains  to  lawsuits
involving  mortgage  foreclosures  and  extends  the  time  between  default  and
collection  of  the  proceeds  by  a  creditor.
A debtor  has  20  days  after  commencement  of  the  foreclosure  action  to  answer
the  complaint  (N.D.R.Civ.P.  12(a)).  Common  practice  is  for  the  creditor  to
also  file  a  motion  requesting  a  summary  judgment,  which  means  the  judge  is  to
enter  a  decision  in  the  creditor's  favor  without  a  trial.  Summary  judgments
will  be  granted  after  a  hearing  on  the  motion  and  a  finding  that  "there  is  no
genuine  issue  as  to  any  material  fact"  (N.D.R.Civ.P.  56(c)).  Generally,
summary  judgments  are  granted  in  foreclosure  actions  because  there  is  no
question  as  to  the  debtor's  obligation  and  that  it  was  not  fulfilled.
A judgment  or  court  decision  in  favor  of  a creditor  (whether  rendered  as  a
summary  judgment  or  after  a  trial)  is  to  be  accompanied  by  an  order  for  the
encumbered  property  to  be  sold  (N.D.C.C.  32-19-06).  A  court  ordered  sale  of
real  estate  involves  the  judge  issuing  a  writ  of  execution  instructing  the
sheriff  to  levy  upon  the  property  and  conduct  a  sale  (N.D.C.C.  Chapter  28-21,
sections  04,  06,  and  09).  The  writ  of  execution  cannot  be  issued  by  the  judge-4-
until  10  days  have  passed  since  entry  of  the  judgment  (N.D.R.Civ.P.  62(a)).
However,  a  sheriff  may  levy  upon  personal  property  after  receiving  a  certified
copy  of  the  judgment  rather  than  waiting  for  the  judge  to  issue  a  writ  of
execution  (N.D.C.C.  28-21-05.1).
A sheriff  levies  upon  real  property  by  filing  a  notice  with  the  register  of
deeds  in  the  county  where  the  land  is  located.  Personal  property  capable  of
manual  delivery  is  levied  upon  when  the  sheriff  takes  possession  of  it
(N.D.C.C.  28-21-08).  The  property  is  sold  at  public  auction  after
advertisement  (N.D.C.C.  28-23-07).  Sale  of  real  property  must  be  advertised
once  a  week  for  three  weeks  with  the  last  publication  at  least  10  days  before
sale  (N.D.C.C.  28-23-04)  whereas  a sale  of  personal  property  has  to  be
advertised  once  a  week  for  two  weeks  (N.D.C.C.  28-23-01).  Proceeds  from  the
sale  are  used  to  pay  selling  costs  and  the  foreclosed  mortgage  or  security
interest,  with  any  remaining  proceeds  paid  to  the  debtor  (N.D.C.C.  28-23-11).
Self-Help  Remedies  of  Article  9
The  alternative  procedure  for  enforcing  a security  interest  in  personal
property  is  for  the  creditor  to  repossess  it.  Possession  of  the  property  can
be  accomplished  without  a  legal  action  as  long  as  the  seizure  will  not  breach
the  peace  (N.D.C.C.  41-09-49).  A "Claim  and  Delivery"  action  must  be  brought
in  court,  however,  if  the  property  cannot  be  possessed  without  breaching  the
peace  (N.D.C.C.  32-07).  This  legal  action  involves  a court's  ordering  the
sheriff  to  seize  the  encumbered  property  and  place  it  in  the  possession  of  the
creditor.  Once  possession  is attained,  the  creditor  may  propose  to  retain  the
property  in  full  satisfaction  or  sell  the  property  in  a  commercially
reasonable  manner  (N.D.C.C.  41-09-51(2)  and  N.D.C.C.  41-09-50(3)).
A debtor  is  entitled  to  be  notified  as  to  a  sale  or  the  creditor's  intent  to
retain  the  property.  The  law  permits  a debtor  to  object  to  an  intent  to
retain  the  property  in  full  satisfaction  and  demand  that  it  be  sold  instead
(N.D.C.C.  41-09-51(2)).  Proceeds  from  a  sale  are  dispersed  in  a manner
similar  to  that  following  a  foreclosure  sale.
Four  Complicating  Principles
The  preceding  sections  presented  an  overview  of  enforcing  a real  estate
mortgage  or  a security  interest  in  personal  property.  However,  North  Dakota
has  additional  statutes  which  further  define  the  rights  and  limitations  of
creditors  and  borrowers  under  foreclosure.  This  section  explains  the  impact
several  of  these  statutes  have  upon  the  foreclosure  process.  The  following
list specifies  the  popular  name  of  each  statute  and  impact  of  applying  the
law.
1.  Confiscatory  price  statute  Increases  the  uncertainty  as  to
whether  a  summary  judgment  for
foreclosure  will  be  granted-5-
2.  Deficiency  judgment  statute  Defines  and  limits  the  remedies  for
creditors  if  the  proceeds  from  a
foreclosure  sale  are  not  sufficient  to
fully  repay  the  debt
3.  Exempt  property  statute  Specifies  which  property  of  the  debtor
cannot  be  seized  to  satisfy  an
obligation
4,  Rights  of  redemption  Sets  forth  the  process  by  which  a
debtor  may  reacquire  the  foreclosed
property
Each  law  adds  complexity  and  some  uncertainty  to  enforcing  a mortgage  or
security  interest.  The  statutes  are  presented  in  the  order  in  which  they  are
likely  to  arise  during  an  enforcement  action.
Confiscatory  Price  Statute
A previous  section  explained  that a  summary  judgment  will  be  granted  if  there
are  no  issues  as  to  material  facts.  A disagreement  as  to  (1)  the  amount  owed,
(2)  whether  there  has  been  a default,  or  (3)  whether  the  debtor  has  a  legal
defense  explaining  why  the  payment  is  not  due  at  this  time  are  some  issues
that  prevent  a  court  from  granting  summary  judgment.  Generally  the  first  two
issues  are  not  disputed,  but  recently  debtors  have  been  raising  the  third
issue  by  relying  on  a statute  enacted  during  the  depression  of  the  1930s.
This  statute  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  "confiscatory  price  defense"  and
grants  state  courts  additional  discretionary  authority  if  the  price  of  farm
products  is  less  than  the  cost  of  production  or  if  a  foreclosure  would  have
the  effect  of  confiscating  a  debtor's  property  (N.D.C.C.  28-29-04  and  is
reproduced  in  Appendix  A).  The  added  authority  permits  the  court  to  extend
the  time  for  completion  of  a foreclosure.
The  statute,  as  currently  written  and  interpreted,  does  not  resolve  all  the
issues  that  may  arise.  First,  there  is  a question  as  to  the  statute's
constitutionality.  This  issue  has  not  been  addressed  by  the  state  supreme
court  even  though  the  court  has  decided  several  cases  in  which  the  defense  was
raised.  A second  question  is  the  uncertainty  as  to  what  conditions  must  be
met  in  order  for  the  statute  to  be  triggered.  For  example,  application  of  the
law  is  complicated  by  issues  such  as  determining  cost  of  production  and  price
of  farm  products.
A third  uncertainty  is  how  courts  may  exercise  their  authority  if  it  is
determined  that  the  law  has  been  triggered.  The  statute  empowers  judges  to
extend  the  time  for  filing,  stay  entry  of  a  judgment,  defer  term  of  the  court,
or  delay  signing  of  orders.  Duration  of  these  extensions  is  not explicitly
specified  but  instead  is  limited  by  language  such  as  "in  the  best  interest  of
the  litigants"  or  "advisable  and  just."  A fourth  unresolved  question  is  what
may  be  required  of  a  debtor  during  the  period  of  delay.  Certainly  interest  on-6-
the  debt  will  continue  to  accrue,  but  the  law  does  not  clarify whether
interest  or  some  other  payment  will  be  required  during  the  period  of  delayed
repayment.
One  consequence  of  a  debtor's  raising  this  defense  is  that  a  summary  judgment
may  not  be  granted  (Federal  Land  Bank  v.  Halverson,  392  N.W.2d  77  (N.D.
1986)).  Instead,  a  trial  must  be  held  and  a  determination  made  as  to  whether
the  conditions  exist  for  triggering  the  statute.  The  additional  time  needed
for  conducting  a  trial  may  add  several  months  to  almost  a  year  to  the  time
until  a  foreclosure  is  ordered  by  the  court.  A  second  consequence  would  be
the  additional  time  involved  if  a  court  determines  that  the  statute  has  been
triggered,  especially  if  the  judge  uses  the  added  discretion  to  further  extend
the  time  for  payment,  which  likely  would  be  the  case.
Anti-deficiency  Judgment  Law
The  explanation  in  a  preceding  section  described  disposition  of  proceeds
received  from  a  foreclosure  sale.  Cost  of  conducting  the  sale  are  paid  first,
and  the  foreclosed  obligation  paid  second.  The  explanation,  however,  did  not
mention  the  general  rule  that  a  creditor  may  continue  to  pursue  a debtor  if
the  sale  proceeds  are  inadequate  to  fully  pay  the  outstanding  obligation.
A deficiency  judgment  is  the  legal  procedure  for  seeking  an  additional  payment
if  sale  of  the  collateral  did  not  generate  sufficient  revenue  to  pay  the
entire  debt.  The  actual  process  for  securing  a deficiency  judgment  requires
the  creditor  to  return  to  court  and  request  a  second  judgment  stating  that  the
debt  was  not  fully  paid  by  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  encumbered  property.
The  amount  of  a  deficiency  judgment  generally  is  the  difference  between  the
amount  of  debt  and  the  amount  the  creditor  received  from  the  foreclosure  sale.
Notes  secured  by  personal  or  real  property  are  entitled  to  deficiency
judgments.  The  legal  process  for  attaining  a  deficiency  judgment  in  North
Dakota  following  foreclosure  of  a  real  property  mortgage,  however,  is  so
restrictive  that  there  has  not  been  one  in  recent  years.  Consequently,  this
procedure  generally  is  referred  to  as  the  "anti-deficiency  judgment"  statute
(N.D.C.C.  32-19-06).
North  Dakota  initially  prohibited  deficiency  judgments  following  a real  estate
mortgage  foreclosure  in  1933.  This  prohibition  was  re-emphasized  by
legislation  in  1937  after  a  supreme  court  decision  defined  an  exception  to  the
1933  law.  The  total  prohibition  continued  until  1951  when  the  legislature
again  amended  the  law  to  allow  deficiency  judgments  if  the  statutory
requirements  were  met.  This  amendment  was  enacted  in  response  to  the  Federal
Land  Bank's  refusal  to  extend  credit  if  a  deficiency  judgment  could  not  be
sought  following  foreclosure  of  a  real  estate  mortgage.
The  first  requirement  of  the  North  Dakota  statute  is  that  a  creditor  must
state  in  the  summons  and  complaint  that  a  deficiency  judgment  will  be  sought
if  the  sale  proceeds  are  not  sufficient  to  repay  the  debt.  The  second
requirement  is  that  a  separate  legal  action  to  attain  a  deficiency  judgment  be-7  -
brought  within  90  days  after  the  foreclosure  sale.  The  third  requirement  is
that  a  jury  determine  the  fair  market  value  of  the  foreclosed  property.
The  law  provides  that  a  deficiency  judgment  cannot  be  granted  unless  the  fair
value  of  the  foreclosed  property  as  determined  by  the  jury  is  less  than  the
amount  owed  the  creditor.  The  statute  also  limits  the  amount  of  a  deficiency
judgment  to  the  difference  between  the  amount  of  debt  and  the  property's  fair
value.  Consequently,  North  Dakota  law  limits  a  deficiency  judgment  following
foreclosure  of  a  real  estate  mortgage  to  the  lesser  of:
1.  the  amount  of  debt  minus  the  amount  the  creditor  received  from  the  sale,
and
2.  the  amount  of  debt  minus  the  fair  value  of  the  property  as  determined  by
the  jury.
A result of  the  law  is  that  deficiency  judgments  following  foreclosure  of  a
real  estate  mortgage  are  seldom  sought.  This  appears  to  be  due  to  both  the
cost  of  a  jury  trial  and  the  likelihood  that  the  fair  value  of  the  property
will  be  determined  to  be  greater  than  the  amount  of  proceeds  from  the
foreclosure  sale.
By  comparison,  creditors  may  seek  a  deficiency  judgment  following  the
enforcement  of  a  security  interest  in  personal  property  (N.D.C.C.  41-09-50(2))
without  a  jury  determination  of  the  property's  fair  value.  Creditors  that
have  a  lien  upon  both  personal  and  real  property  usually  enforce  the  security
agreement  against  the  personal  property  first  and  then  seek  any  remaining
amount  from  the  land.  This  sequence  of  enforcement  allows  creditors  to
maximize  their  collection  before  the  limitation  of  the  "anti-deficiency
judgment"  law  applies.
A deficiency  is  enforced  by  having  a  judgment  recorded  and  a writ  of  execution
issued  ordering  the  sheriff  to  seize  property,  as  described  above.  This  time
the  sheriff  will  levy  upon  any  property  belonging  to  the  debtor  since  the
property  encumbered  by  the  creditor  has  already  been  foreclosed.  There  is  a
limit,  however.  The  sheriff  may  not  seize  property  of  the  debtor  that  is
considered  exempt  under  state  law.
North  Dakota  Exemptions
The  purpose  of  exempting  property  from  seizure  for  payment  of  debt  is  to  leave
the  indebted  person  with  sufficient  resources  to  survive  and  financially
rebuild.  The  major  exemption  provided  in  North  Dakota  law  is  the  homestead
(N.D.C.C.  47-18-01),  which  is  defined  as  a person's  dwelling  house  and  the
land  upon  which  it  is  situated,  with  a value  not  in  excess  of  $80,000.  The
homestead  can  be  levied  upon  and  sold  if  the  debt  that  is  being  foreclosed
encumbers  it.  Therefore,  a  homestead  often  is  not  a  meaningful  protection
since  farm  land  mortgages  usually  encumber  the  farmstead  and  house  as  well  as
the  unimproved  agricultural  land.-8-
Other  property  that  is  exempt  under  state  law  includes  family  pictures,  a
sitting  place  in  a  house  of  worship,  burial  plots,  family  Bible  and  books  not
to  exceed  $100  in  value,  the  family's  clothing,  and  one  year's  supply  of
provisions  for  the  debtor  and  family,  including  fuel  (N.D.C.C.  28-22-02).
Insurance  covering  these  items  also  is  exempt.  The  law  includes  the  homestead
(as  explained  in  the  preceding  paragraph)  but  permits  a  trailer  or  mobile  home
to  be  substituted  for  a  homestead.  These  items  are  referred  to  as  absolute
exemptions.
The  head  of  a  household  also  may  exempt  crops  from  160  acres  except  for
production  costs  (N.D.C.C.  28-22-02(8)).  An  alternative  for  the  head  of  a
household  is  to  exempt  personal  property  up  to  a  value  of  $5,000  rather  than
the  crops  from  160  acres  (N.D.C.C.  28-22-03).  Another  alternative  is  to
select  books  and  instruments  up  to  $1,500  in  value,  household  furnishings  up
to  $1,000 in  value,  livestock  and  implements  not  exceeding  $4,500  in  value,
and  tools  of  the  trade  or  books  of  a  profession  up  to  a value  of  $1,000
(N.DC.C.  28-22-04).
A single  person  does  not  have  the  alternatives  mentioned  in  the  preceding
paragraph  but  instead  may  exempt  personal  property  with  a  value  of  $2,500
(N.D.C.C.  22-28-05)  in  addition  to  the  absolute  exemptions.
Residents  may  claim  $7,500  rather  than  a  homestead  (N.D.C.C.  28-22-03.1).
This  alternative  translates  into  $15,000  for  a married  couple  living  in  the
state  since  each  is  a resident.  Each  resident  also  may  exempt  a vehicle  up  to
$1,200  in  value,  cash  value  of  life  insurance  not  to  exceed  $4,000,  and  the
right  to  receive  limited  payments  from  specified  pension  programs  and  certain
legal  actions.
The  purpose  of  identifying  exempt  property  is  to  estimate  the  value  of
property  a  creditor  cannot  seize  regardless  of  laws  which  delay  repayment  or
reduce  the  amount  of  debt.  Only  nonexempt  property  is  considered  in
estimating  the  economic  impact  of  a  delay  or  reduction  in  repayment.  This
study  assumes  that  (1)  the  homestead  will  be  claimed  unless  it  is  encumbered
and  (2)  the  other  exemptions  will  approximate  $20,000o
Right  of  Redemption
Debtors  are  not  without  legal  rights  or  protection  after  a foreclosure.  A
major  privilege  is  the  debtor's  right  of  redemption,  which  permits  the  debtor
to  reacquire  ownership  of  foreclosed  property  by  paying  the  amount  that  was
bid  at  the  sale,  regardless  who  was  the  successful  buyer.  The  right  to  redeem
real  estate  that  has  been  foreclosed  generally  is  one  year  in  North  Dakota
(N.D.C.C.  28-24-02).  In  addition,  a debtor  has  the  right  to  possess  the
property  and  retain  all  earnings,  profits,  and  rents  that  accrue  during  the
redemption  period;  that  is,  a  debtor  is  permitted  to  use  the  land  for  one  more
year  after  the  foreclosure  sale  (N.D.C.C.  28-24-11).  This  privilege  does  not
require  the  debtor  to  pay  any  costs,  such  as  property  taxes,  during  that  year
and  is  not  conditioned  on  the  debtor's  exercising  the  right  to  redeem  before
the  period  lapse.-9-
North  Dakota  law  provides  that  the  right of  redemption  may  only  be  six  months
from  the  time  of  filing  the  summons  and  complaint  (N.D.C.C.  32-19.1).  This
shorter  period  is  available  if  no  more  than  40  acres  are  subject  to  the
mortgage,  the  debtor  agreed  to  the  shorter  term  when  the  mortgage  was
executed,  and  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  original  indebtedness  remains
unpaid.  The  redemption  period  is  one  year  from  the  time  of  filing  the  lawsuit
if  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  debt  is  outstanding.
Redemption  period  for  personal  property  expires  upon  the  foreclosure  sale  or
after  the  debtor  fails  to  object  to  a  creditor's  intent  to  retain  the  property
in  full  satisfaction  (N.D.C.C.  41-09-52).
Right  of  redemption  is  another  law  that  permits  a delay  in  repayment;  a  buyer
at  the  sheriff  sale  does  not  have  use  of  the  property  until  one  year  later.
Even  though  state  law  provides  for  the  creditor  to  be  paid  as  soon  as  the
court  approves  the  sale  and  disbursement  of  the  proceeds  (N.D.C.C.  28-23-13),
the  creditor  seldom  receives  any  benefits  during  the  redemption  period  because
the  creditor  usually  is  the  buyer  at  the  sale.  Practically  no  one  bids  at  a
foreclosure  sale  except  the  creditor  which  means  the  purchasing  institution
will  not  have  access  to  sell  or  lease  the  land  until  a year  after  the  sale.
The  delay  in  a  creditor's  acquiring  control  over  the  property  is  not  solely
due  to  the  redemption  law.  Instead,  the  delay  results  from  a  combination  of
the  right  to  redeem  and  the  lack  of  buyers.  Regardless  of  whether  the
redemption  right  is  the  reason  for  the  lack  of  bidders,  the  practical
consequence  is  that  the  debtor's  right  to  redeem  delays  payment  for  most
farmland  foreclosures  until,  at  least,  one  year  after  the  sale.
Economic  Impact  of  Delayed  and  Partial  Repayment
This  section  explains  the  model  for  estimating  the  economic  impact  of  laws
that  delay  or  permit  partial  repayment  of  indebtedness.  Computing  the  impact
of  delayed  repayment  will  be  addressed.first,  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the
procedure  for  estimating  the  impact  of  partial  repayment.  The  last topic  in
this  section  is  an  explanation  of  a  model  used  to  estimate  the  implications
for  future  credit  availability  due  to  the  economic  impacts  of  such  laws.  The
model  will  not  estimate  the  legal  costs  to  either  borrowers  or  lenders  of
determining  whether  the  law  is relevant.  Similarly,  the  model  does  not
include  the  lender's  administrative  costs  of  servicing  debt  for which
repayment  has  been  delayed.
Impact  of  Delayed  Repayment
Both  a  delinquent  borrower  and  the  creditor  are  impacted  by  a  law  which
permits  delayed  repayment  of  a debt  obligation.  The  economic  impact  can  be
defined  as  the  change  in  wealth  of  the  person  as  a  result  of  the  law.  The
type  of  impact  is  similar  (but  opposite)  for  both  parties  although  the
magnitude  will  differ  slightly  depending  on  each  parties'opportunity  cost  of
capital.  The  economic  impact  upon  a  creditor  will  be  explained  first.- 10  -
The  economic  impact  to  creditors  depends  on  several  variables.  These  include
(1)  gross  uncollected  interest  (which  is  the  amount  of  income  that  could  have
been  earned  had  the  payment  not  been  delayed),  (2)  the  amount  of  income  that
is  actually  received  as  a  consequence  of  the  additional  time,  (3)  the  cost  of
maintaining  the  property  during  the  delay,  (4)  change  in  the  amount  a creditor
is  repaid  due  to  changes  in  the  value  of  collateral,  and  (5)  change  in  the
value  of  acquired  property  before  liquidation.  Formula  1 illustrates  the
relationships  between  the  variables.  Each  variable  is  discussed  in  more
detail  in  the  following  paragraphs.
ECONIMP  =  GUI  - AR  +  MAIN  + REP  +  ACQPROP  (1)
where
ECONIMP  = economic  impact  due  to  laws  which  delay  repayment
GUI  = gross  uncollected  interest
AR  = amount  of  interest  and  other  income  a  creditor  receives
during  the  delay
MAIN  = maintenance  cost
REP  =  change  in  amount  of  repayment  as  a consequence  of  a delay
in  foreclosure
ACQPROP  = change  in  value  of  acquired  property  during  a delay  in
liquidation
Delays  in  repayment  can  be  categorized  as  (1)  those  which  arise  during  the
foreclosure  procedure  and  postpone  the  creditor's  taking  control  of  the
collateral,  and  (2)  delays  in  reselling  the  property  after  a creditor  has
acquired  ownership  through  foreclosure  or  voluntary  conveyance  by  the
borrower.  The  distinction  is  necessary  for  two  reasons.  The  first  reason  is
that  some  laws  (such  as  the  "confiscatory  price"  statute)  postpone  foreclosure
whereas  other  laws  (such  as  the  borrower's  right  to  redeem)  limit and  thereby
delay  a  credit  institution's  opportunity  to  sell  the  property  once  it  acquires
ownership.  The  second  reason  for  the  distinction  is  that  the  value  of  some
variables  used  to  estimate  economic  impacts  varies  depending  on  when  the  delay
occurs  during  the  enforcement  procedure.  The  amount  received  by  the  creditor
during  the  delay  is  an  example  of  such  a  variable,  and  this  will  be  more  fully
explained  in  the  section  which  discusses  that  variable.
Gross  Uncollected  Interest  (GUI)
Gross  uncollected  interest  is  the  amount  of  income  that  could  have  been  earned
had  the  law  not  delayed  repayment.  Factors  which  influence  the  amount  of
gross  uncollected  interest  are  (1)  collectible  proceeds  (which  is  the  dollar
value  of  property  or  cash  that  would  have  been  received  by  the  creditor  had
the  delay  not  been  implemented)  (2)  the  rate  at  which  income  would  be  earned
had  the  debt  been  paid,  and  (3)  the  duration  of  the  delay.  Formula  2
illustrates  the  relation  among  these  factors.
Gross  uncollected  interest  =  collectible  proceeds  (2)
x  interest  rate  for  new  loans
x  duration  of  the  delay- 11  -
Collectible  proceeds depends  on  whether  the  debt is secured and  the  type  of
property  used as  collateral.  Accordingly,  indebtedness  can  be  categorized as
(1)  debt secured by  land or  real  property,  (2)  debt  secured by  chattel  or
personal  property,  (3)  debt secured  by  both real  and  personal  property, and
(4)  unsecured  debt.
The collectible proceeds for debt secured  by  land  is  the  lesser of  (1)  the
amount of  debt or  (2)  the  value  of  the  collateral.  This reflects  North
Dakota's  "anti-deficiency judgment"  law,  which,  for all  practical  purposes,
eliminates any  deficiency judgment  following a  real  estate  mortgage
foreclosure.
Collectible proceeds for  debt that is  secured  by  chattel  is  the  lesser of  (1)
the amount of  debt  or  (2)  the  value  of  the  collateral  plus the  collectible
deficiency.  The  definition  of  collectible  deficiency is  the amount a  creditor
can  collect from a  borrower after adjusting  for  other  indebtedness  and
statutory exemptions.  The amount of  the  collectible  deficiency is  never  less
than  zero and  depends  on whether the  creditor is  assumed  to  be  the  first or
last creditor  paid.  The  estimated impact of a law  that delays  repayment will
be  greater if  the  creditor is  assumed to  be  paid  first.  Both assumptions  can
be  conceptualized in  formulas  as  follows:
Collectible  deficiency  if  the  creditor is  last to  be  paid  =  (3)
(land  value  - land debt - $80,000)*
+  current assets +  intermediate  assets - current debt - intermediate
debt
- $20,000
Collectible  deficiency  if  creditor  is  first  to  be  paid =  (4)
(land  value  - land  debt - $80,000)*
+  current assets +  intermediate  assets - debt secured,  by  current
assets - debt secured  by  intermediate assets
- $20,000
The  values  $80,000 and  $20,000 represent the  borrower's  personal  exemptions,
as  explained in  a  preceding  section.  These  formulas also are  based  on  two
additional  assumptions.  The first assumption  is  that any  equity in  the  land
is  converted  to  homestead property.  A  corollary  to  this  assumption is  that
equity  in  personal  property  will  not be  used  to  reduce  the  land  mortgage  in
order  to  maximize the  homestead exemption.  This  limitation is  incorporated
into  the  formula  by  not allowing  the  total  in  parentheses marked with an
asterisk  (*)  to  be  less  than  zero.  A second assumption  is  that the  value of
chattel a creditor acquires will  equal  the  reduction in  the  debt;  therefore,
the  borrower's equity  in  intermediate  and  current assets  is  the  same  before
and after  the  creditor reacquires  the  security.
*Amount  in  parentheses will  be  the  calculated total  or  zero, whichever
is greater.- 12  -
More data  are  necessary  to  estimate the  collectible deficiency  when  the
creditor is assumed  the  first to  be  paid.  Accordingly,  the  second assumption
(that is,  the  creditor  is  the  last to  be  paid)  has  been  accepted for  this
study.  This assumption  was  slightly modified  by  further assuming  the  debtor
would  be  the  last one  to  collect from  the  chattel  but would be  the  first
creditor  to  collect a deficiency from any  nonexempt equity in  the  land.
Collectible deficiency  =  (5)
(land  value  - land  debt - $80,000)*
+  (current assets  +  intermediate  assets - debt secured  by  current
assets - debt  secured by  intermediate  assets)*
- $20,000
Collectible proceeds  for debt secured by  both real  and  personal  property would
be  the  lesser  of  (1)  the amount of debt and  2)  value  of  the  security.  This
reflects  the  practice  explained in  a previous  section  that liens  on  personal
property are  enforced  first, with  the  real  property mortgages  subsequently
foreclosed.
The collectible proceeds when  the  debt is  unsecured  is  the  lesser  of  (1)  the
amount of  debt and  (2)  the  collectible  deficiency as  described  in  the
preceding  paragraph.
The  second  factor is  the opportunity cost of  the  collectible  proceeds.  The
opportunity  cost of  these  funds  is  assumed  to  be  the  interest rate  on  new
loans.  This  investment 'alternative  represents the  most profitable  use  of  the
collectible  proceeds.
Duration  of  the  delay  is  the  third  factor  affecting estimation of gross
uncollected interest.  Estimating  the economic impact of a particular law
initially  requires  that  the  length  of  the  delay attributable  to  that law be
determined.  Conceptually,  this  is  the  difference  between  the  time of
repayment when  the  law is  applied and when  repayment would occur  if  the  law
was  not in  affect.  The  difference in  time  of  repayment, however, is  not
easily observed nor  exactly measured.  An  alternative  to  having  creditors and
borrowers speculate  as  to when  repayment would  have  occurred had  the  law been
different is  to  use  the  length of  delinquency  as a  proxy  for  the duration of
the delay.
Interest and  Other  Income  Received during the  Delay  (AR)
The  second  variable  for  estimating  economic impact of a  delay in  repayment is
the amount of  income  the  creditor  receives during  the  delay.  This income
benefits  creditors  and,  therefore, enters  formula  1  as a negative value  to
partially  offset the  amount of  gross  uncollected interest.
*Amount  in  parentheses will  be  the  calculated total  or  zero,  whichever
is  greater.- 13  -
The  amount  of  income  will  vary  depending  on  whether  the  law  postpones
foreclosure  or  delays  resale  after  the  creditor  has  ownership.  If  the  law
being  analyzed  postpones  foreclosure,  the  amount  of  income  will  be  the
interest  that  accrues  during  the  delay  and  is  actually  paid  by  the  borrower
to  the  creditor.  By  comparison,  the  amount  of  income  a creditor  receives
during  a delay  in  reselling  the  property  will  usually  reflect  the  opportunity
to  lease  the  collateral  until  a  sale  is  arranged.  The  opportunity  to  lease
acquired  property  will  primarily  depend  on  the  time  of  the  year  the  creditor
receives  ownership.  It  also  must  be  recognized  that  North  Dakota's  redemption
law  eliminates  the  creditor's  right  to  lease  the  land  for  the  first year  after
foreclosure.
Maintenance  Cost  (MAIN)
The  third  variable  is  the  amount  that  has  to  be  paid  during  the  delay  to
maintain  the  value  of  the  security.  Real  estate  taxes  are  the  most
substantial  maintenance  cost  incurred  by  financial  institutions  even  though
property  insurance  premiums  and  repairs  occasionally  are  paid  by  a creditor.
This  study  assumes  maintenance  costs  are  directly  related  to  the  duration  of
the  delay.
Change  in  Amount  of  Repayment  (REP)
The  purpose  of  the  fourth  variable  is  to  account  for  any  change  in  the  amount
a  creditor  is  repaid  as  a  consequence  of  an  increase  or  decrease  in  the  value
of  the  collateral  that  occurs  during  the  delay  before  foreclosure.  For
example,  the  amount  a creditor  is  repaid  will  decrease  as  a result  of  a law
which  delays  repayment  if  the  value  of  the  security  decreases  during  that
delay  and  thereby  renders  the  creditor  undersecured.
Change  in  the  amount  repaid  is  the  collectible  proceeds  at  the  inception  of
the  delay  minus  the  total  of  the  collectible  proceeds  at  termination  of
the  delay  plus  payment  from  the  borrower  to  the  creditor  during  the  delay.
REP  = Collectible  proceeds  at  inception  of  delay  (6)
S(Collectible  proceeds  at  termination  of  delay
+ principal  paid  during  the  delay)
The  definition  of  collectible  proceeds  is  identical  to  that  described  in  a
previous  section  and  continues  to  depend  on  the  type  of  property  securing  the
obligation.  Those  definitions  not  only  account  for  value  of  the  collateral
(collectible  deficiency)  but  also  reflect  whether  creditors  generally  are
undersecured  or  fully  secured.
Change  in  Value  of  Acquired  Property  (ACQPROP)
The  fifth  variable  in  estimating  the  economic  impact  is  change  in  market  value
of  acquired  property  that  occurs  during  a  delay  in  liquidation.  This  impact- 14  -
can  be  calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  market  value  of  the  property
at  the  time  it  would  have  been  sold  and  its  value  at  the  time  it  is  actually
sold.  The  rate  of  change  in  market  value  and  the  duration  of  the  delay  are
two  major  factors.  Change  in  the  value  of  acquired  property  can  be  based  on
reported  increases  or  decreases  in  the  value  of  agricultural  property,  in
general.
Negotiated  Settlements
An  alternative  to  foreclosing  a delinquent  loan  is  for  the  parties  to  resolve
the  delinquency  through  negotiations.  By  agreeing,  the  parties  accept  a
compromise  rather  than  face  litigation  and  its  associated  monetary  costs,  time
demands,  and  uncertainty.  Creditors  who  agree  to  reduce  the  amount  of
principal  or  accrued  interest  owed  and  lower  interest  rates  on  the  remaining
balance  decrease  the  value  of  their  loan  obligation.  From  a  lender's
perspective,  it  is  the  amount  a  creditor  is  willing  to  concede  in  an  attempt
to  entice  the  borrower  to  voluntarily  abandon  use  of  delays  provided  by  the
law.  By  comparison,  borrowers  who  provide  additional  collateral  improve  the
position  of  the  creditor  while  adversely  affecting  their  own.
Consequently,  settlements  are  a factor  in  estimating  the  economic  impact  of  a
law  because  the  compromises  reached  change  under  alternative  laws  which
establish  the  parties'  initial  bargaining  positions  and  the  parameters  for
their  negotiations.  However,  the  amount  forsaken  through  negotiations  is  the
economic  impact  for  settled  loans  whereas  the  formula  described  above  is  the
impact  for  delinquent  loans  that  remain  outstanding.  Combining  the  economic
impact  of  negotiated  settlements  and  the  economic  impact  of  delayed
foreclosure  does  not  double  count  since  the  two  loan  groups  are  mutually
exclusive.  The  primary  difference  between  these  two  groups  is  that
delinquent  loans  must  be  determined  as  of  a  particular  point  in  time,  whereas
extent  of  negotiated  settlements  can  be  determined  only  by  observing  a period
of  time.
It  is  difficult to  identify  which  law  affects  the  level  of  negotiations
because  several  factors  influence  each  party's  bargaining  positions.  These
include  (1)  the  portion  of  a debt  that  is  uncollectible  because  the  borrower
has  a  negative  net  worth,  and  (2)  laws  (such  as  the  "anti-deficiency  judgment"
and  exemptions  statutes)  that  shelter  assets  from  the  reach  of  creditors.
Consequently,  even  creditors  are  reluctant  to  apportion  their  concessions
among  the  various  laws.
The  economic  impact  of  negotiations  is  estimated  as  the  difference  between  the
present  value  of  the  loan  prior  to  settlement  and  the  present  value  of  the
obligation  after  settlement.  The  appropriate  discount  rate  is  the  interest
rate  of  the  loan  at  inception  of  the  delay.- 15  -
Alterations  to  Reflect  the  Borrower's  Perspective
Collectible  proceeds  and  duration  of  the  delay  are  the  same  for  the  borrower
and  creditor.  The  opportunity  cost  for  a  delinquent  borrower,  however,  is  not
the  rate  of  interest  being  charged  on  new  loans,  but  instead  is  the  rate  of
return  the  borrower  earns  by  using  the  property  that  otherwise  would  have  been
paid  to  the  creditor.  The  rate  of  return  a  borrower  generates  will  vary
depending  on  the  time  of  the  year  and  the  stage  of  the  production  season  when
the  delay  is  implemented.  Initiating  a  delay  in  foreclosures  at  the  beginning
of  the  planting  season  and  extending  it  through  harvest will  be  the  most
advantageous  to  borrowers  since  this will  maximize  their  opportunity  to  earn  a
return  on  the  asset  and  minimize  the  interest  cost  that will  accrue.
A borrower  is  adversely  impacted  if  the  amount  paid  as  "interest  during  the
delay"  exceeds  the  amount  earned  during  that  time.  The  amount  of  interest
actually  paid  to  the  creditor will  depend  on  whether  the  earnings  have  been
encumbered  by  another  creditor  and  whether  borrowers  convert  the  earnings  into
a form  that  is  inaccessible  to  creditors,  such  as  exempt  property.
The  amount  of  maintenance  costs  a borrower  is willing  to  incur  depends  on
whether  that  person  holds  any  hope  of  realistically  satisfying  the  debt
obligation.  Without  this  expectation,  the  borrower  would  have  little
incentive  to  provide  long-term  maintenance.
The  economic  impact  upon  a  borrower  as  a  result of  negotiating  a settlement
should  be  equal  but  opposite  the  impact  upon  the  creditor.  The  difficulty  of
estimating  this  amount  is  the  same  from  a borrower's  perspective  as  it  is  from
the  creditor's.  A change  in  the  value  of  collateral  will  benefit  a borrower
only  to  the  extent  a  borrower's  net  worth  is  increased.
Impact  on  Others
Nondelinquent  borrowers  and  other  customers  of  a financial  institution  also
are  affected  by  laws  which  delay  repayment.  These  customers  are  impacted
whenever  the  institution  raises  interest  rates  on  loans  as  well  as  other
service  fees  in  an  effort  to  recover  lost revenue.  The  limit  on  fee  and
interest rate  increases will  be  determined  by  the  level  of  competition  the
institution  faces  and  regulations.  Most  institutions  are  reluctant  to  reduce
interest  rates  paid  on  savings  because  depositors  can  readily  shift  their
resources  to  institutions  offering  higher  returns.
Society,  in  general,  is  impacted  if  rates  of  return  earned  differ  between
existing  borrowers  who  are  delinquent  and  farm  operators  who  eventually
acquire  the  foreclosed  property.  However,  most  research  investigating  whether
the  rate  of  return  on  assets  varies  with  the  level  of  indebtedness  has  not
substantiated  any  consistent  difference  (Plaxico  1986;  Leistritz  1987).
Consequently,  the  impact  on  society  is  not  likely  to  be  significant  regardless
of  who  controls  the  property's  usage.- 16  -
Impact of  Partial  Repayment
The  second  type  of  statute  being  investigated permits partial  repayment of
debt.  This  section describes a model  for estimating  the economic  impact of
such  laws.  Primary  focus will  be  upon  North Dakota's  "anti-deficiency
judgment" statute, which applies only  to real  estate.
The impact of  the  law that permits partial  repayment is  the difference  between
the amount a creditor would be  able  to  collect  in  the absence  of  the  law and
the  amount the  creditor receives  under  the  law.  Deficiency  judgments
following  foreclosure of  real  estate mortgages are,  for all  practical
purposes,  not available  in  North Dakota even  though  the  law  sets  forth a
procedure  for attaining one.  The  statute's economic impact  is  equal  but
opposite  for creditors  and  debtors.
The amount a creditor would collect  in  the absence  of  a limit on  deficiency
judgments  would be  the  lesser of  (1) the amount of  debt, or  (2)  the  value of
the  land  plus  the nonexempt equity  (or what has  been defined as  the
"collectible deficiency").  This assumes  the  credit institution  is  the  last  to
collect  its  loan.
The amount a  creditor collects  in  North Dakota  as a  result of  the limit on
deficiency  judgments is  the  lesser of  (1)  the  amount of  debt,  or (2)  the  value
of  the  security.  Consequently,  undersecured  creditors  are  impacted by  the
law,  and  the amount of  their  impact is  the lesser of  (1)  the  collectible
deficiency or  (2)  debt minus  the value of  the  security.  The  value of  all
personal  and  real  properties  that  secures  a debt  is  included  in  the
computation  because  the  practice  (as  mentioned  above)  is  to  enforce  the
security  interest  against  encumbered  personal  property  first  and  then
foreclose  the real  estate mortgage.
Future Credit Availability
Credit institutions must generate revenue sufficient to  pay  all  costs  if  they
are  to  exist in  the  long  term.  This  implies  that a  lender will  adjust the
rate  of interest charged  to  borrowers  and  the  fees assessed for  other  services
to  compensate  for the  economic impact of  state  laws that  permit partial  or
delayed repayment of  indebtedness.  This  section describes a loan pricing
model  for  estimating the  interest rate adjustment necessary  to  compensate for
the  impact of  state  laws  that permit delayed  repayment.
A  financial  institution must cover all  expenses in  order  to  exist in  the  long
run.  However,  if  revenue exceeds  costs,  the  resulting  economic profit will
encourage others  to  enter the industry.  Total  receipts,  therefore,  are
presumed to equal  total  costs  (formula 7).- 17  -
Total  receipts =  (1-d)  LY  +  d DY
Total  costs =  I +  L +  0 +  E - S - F
and
(1-d)  LY  +  d DY =  I +  L +  0 +  E - S - F  (7)
where
LY  =  loan  volume  times  rate  of  income  from  loans  not  in  default
DY  =  loan  volume  times  rate  of  income  from  loans  in  default
d  =  percent  of  loan  volume  in  default
I  = interest  costs
L  = provision  for  loan  losses
0  =  operating  expenses
E = earnings  for  building  reserves
S = security  income
F = service  fees  and  other  income
Total  receipts  consist  of  interest  income  (LY)  from  borrowers  who  have  not
defaulted  (1-d)  and  other  income  (DY)  from  the  proportion  of  borrowers  who
have  defaulted  (d).  Any  income  collected  from  borrowers  after  default  is
included  in  DY,  but  often  that  value  is  zero.  Total  costs  include  interest
costs  (I)  and  administrative  costs  (L,  0,  E)  adjusted  for  other  income  (S,  F).
Repayment  delays  represent  temporary  shortfalls  in  revenue  and  may  be
capitalized  if  more  than  one  year  is  involved.  The  earnings'  increment
necessary  to  accumulate  additional  reserves  to  meet  these  shortfalls  is
represented  by  a  increase  in  E.
Solving  (7)  algebraically  for  the  level  of  revenue  necessary  to  support  total
costs yields
(1-d)  LY  =  I  +  L + 0 +  E - S - F - (d  DY)  (8)
LY  =  1  (I  +  L  + 0  + E - S  - F  - (d  DY))  (9)
Removing  the  parentheses  and  multiplying  the  numerator  of  each  term  by  (1  - d
+  d)  and  rearranging  provides:
LY  =  I  +L +  0  +  E-  S  F  - DY+  d  (I  +  L +  0  +  E - S - F-  DY)  (10)
interest  administrative  risk
cost  costs  premium
(i)  (a)  (r)
Dividing  both  sides  by  the  level  of  outstanding  balances  provides  an  estimate
of  the  interest  rate  necessary  to  cover  all  costs.  As  shown  in  equation  10,
the  interest  rate  consists  of  three  components--an  interest  cost  (i),  an
adjustment  for  administrative  costs  (a),  and  a  risk  premium  (r),  which  depends
on  the  level  of  defaults  (Lee  and  Baker  n.d.).  Borrower  default  causes  the
creditor  to  incur  (1)  acquisition  interest  costs  and  (2)  associated- 18  -
administrative  costs.  A rise  in  the  default  rate  significantly  increases
credit  costs  as  a result  of  the  relationship  d
There  also  are  nonprice  impacts  on  future  borrowers,  which  often  affect  the
quantity  of  credit  available.  A rise  in  the  price  of  credit  (as  determined  by
equation  10)  to  a  level  above  the  market  rate  forces  the  lender  to  ration
credit  to  only  selected  borrowers  if  they  are  to  control  default  levels  and
remain  competitive.  The  consequence  is  reduced  credit availability.
Lenders  consider  diverse  credit  standards  in  evaluating  a  borrower  when
credit  availability  tightens.  These  standards  relate  to  the  debtor's
liquidity,  leverage,  profitability,  collateral,  tenure,  repayment  ability,  and
repayment  history.  Creditors  use  these  standards  to  implement  new  policies
when  rationing  credit  to  only  high  quality  borrowers.  The  model  developed
provides  an  indication  as  to  what  some  of  these  standards  may  be  in  the
future.
This  section  described  the  various  models  needed  to  estimate  the  economic
impact  upon  creditors  and  borrowers  when  law  permits  delayed  and  partial
repayment.  The  next  section  details  the  data  collection  process  employed  in
this  study  and  the  results  of  the  analysis.
Economic  Impact  on  Credit  Institutions
Two  survey  instruments  were  developed  to  elicit  the  information  necessary  for
estimation  of  the  model  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  The  first survey
(survey  1)  requested  specific  information  about  each  delinquent  loan  as  of
July  1,  1986,  held  by  financial  institutions  that  loan  money  to  North  Dakota
farmers  for  purchases  of  chattel  or  real  estate  (Appendix  B).  Data  from  this
survey  were  used  to  estimate  the  total  amount  of  delinquent  debt  in  the  state
and  to  appraise  the  current  status  of  each  delinquent  loan  and  the  borrower's
financial  condition.  The  second  survey  (survey  2)  solicited  general
information  about  each  financial  institution's  capital  structure,  operating
costs,  and  lending  practices.  This  instrument  also  gathered  information  about
debt  restructuring  and  negotiated  settlements  (Appendix  C).
The  surveys  were  distributed  September  5,  1986,  to  180  federal,  state,  and
independently  chartered  banks,  4 regional  Farm  Credit  Services  (FCS)  offices,
3  savings  and  loans,  the  credit  divisions  of  10  full-  and  short-line
manufacturers  of  farm  machinery,  and  11  credit  unions.  Initially,  63
institutions  responded  to  the  survey  (Table  1).  These  consisted  of  57  banks,
4  FCS  offices,  1  savings  and  loan,  and  1 machinery  manufacturer.  The  data
provided  information  on  2,086  delinquent  loans.
A follow-up  telephone  survey  was  conducted  to  statistically test  whether  non-
responding  banks  had  a  different  level  of  delinquent  loans  than  banks  that  had
responded.  Seventeen  banks  that  had  not  responded  to  the  surveys  were
randomly  selected  and  contacted  to  answer  the  questions  of  an  abbreviated
survey  2  (Appendix  D).- 19  -
TABLE  1. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDING FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS
Number  of  Delinquent
Institutional  Type  Responses  Loans
Banks  57
Farm Credit Services  4
Savings and loans  1
Machinery manufacturers  1
Total  63  2,086a
aNumber  of  delinquent loans reported  by  category  is not provided  in  order  to
not  disclose confidential  information.
Results  of  the  tests  are  shown  in Table 2.  The absolute  value of the  z-
statistic must exceed 2.32  (large  sample  test of mean  differences)  in  order
for  a difference to  be  considered statistically  significant at the  5 percent
confidence  level.  The  total  delinquent  loan volume, agricultural  loan  volume,
and delinquent agricultural  loan  volume  were not significantly different for
both  groups.  Any  variation  in responses would be  due  solely  to  sampling.
Thus,  the sample of  reporting  banks  can  be  considered  representative of  all
banks  in  the  state.
State-level  estimates are  derived  by  adjusting  the  lenders'  survey  responses
for missing  observations and extrapolating to  the  state  level.  For example,
agricultural  loan  volume of  responding banks,  savings and  loans,  and machinery
manufacturers  (BSLMM) was obtained  from only  41 of  the  59  institutions.  The
TABLE  2.  SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  RESPONDING AND  NONRESPONDING BANKS,
Responding Banks  Follow-up Survey  Z-Test
Variable  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Statistic
percent-------
Total  Delinquent
loan volume  6.45  4.02  4.29  3.94  1.99
Agricultural
loan  volume  36.81  26.22  48.44  33.74  -1.31
Delinquent agricultural
loan volume  6.69  9.51  9.10  16.71  - .57- 20  -
aggregate  loan  volume  representative  of  BSLMM  was  indexed  upward  by  a  factor  of
59/41.  Using  this  method,  aggregate  agricultural  loan  volume  of  all  institutions
in  the  sample  was  $2.035  billion.  Latest  USDA  data  show  total  agricultural  debt
held  by  lenders  in  North  Dakota  as  $3.442  billion  (Table  3).  This  amount  excludes
Farmers  Home  Administration,  Commodity  Credit  Corporation,  and  40  percent  of
individual  and  other  debt  since  these  institutions were  not  surveyed.  The
aggregate  loan  volume  of  the  institutions  in  the  sample  divided  by  this  number
equals  1.6914  and  is  defined  as  the  survey's  expansion  factor.  In  other  words,
TABLE  3.  AMOUNT OF  AGRICULTURAL DEBT HELD  BY  ALL
LENDERS, AND  RESPONDING LENDERS
NORTH DAKOTA LENDERS, SURVEYED
Agricultural  Agricultural
Debt  Held  by  Agricultural  Debt  Reported
All  North  Debt  Surveyed  By  Responding
Dakotaa  Lenders  (Population)  Lenders
Real  Estate  Debt  ----  million  dollars-----  -------
Federal  Land  Bank  1,358  1,358  -d
Farmers  Home  Administration  353  -- b  _b
Life  Insurance  Companies  61  61  -d
Banks  100  100  d
Individuals  and  others  537  215c  d
2.409  1  77?
Non-Real  Estate  Debt
Banks  960  960  d
Production  Credit  Association  612  612  d
FICB  26  26  _d
Farmers  Home  Administration  558  -b  _-b
Individuals  and  others  276  110c  -d
Commodity  Credit  Corporation  902  -b  b
3,334  1,708
GRAND  TOTAL  5,743  3,442  2,035
Expansion  Factor  1.6914
aUnited  States  Department  of  Agriculture.
Sector--State  Financial  Summary,  1984.
Washington,  D.C.
bNot  included  in  this  study.
c40% is  assumed  held  by  other  lenders.
dData  are  not  available  due  to  disclosure
1986.  Economic  Indicators  of  the  Farm
Economic  Research  Service,  ECIFS  4-5,
requirements.- 21  -
this  sample  represents  59.1  percent  of  the  debt  held  by  these  agricultural  lenders
in  North  Dakota.  When  extrapolating  the  results  of  the  survey  to  the  state-level,
all  responses  are  multiplied  by  the  expansion  factor.
Delinquent  Agricultural  Loans
Total  delinquent  agricultural  loan  volume  in  North  Dakota  as  of  July  1,  1986,
was  $466.1  million  or  13.5  percent  of  the  state's agricultural  loan  volume.
Figure  1 illustrates  the  distribution  of  delinquent  agricultural  loan  volume
by  county.  The  Red  River  Valley,  four  counties  in  the  southeast,  two  counties
along  the  western  border  and  several  counties  in  the  midsection  of  the  state
have  the  most  delinquent  agricultural  debt  in  absolute  dollar  amounts.
Total  delinquent  agricultural  debt  for  each  county,  however,  does  not  consider
the  size  of  the  county,  nor  the  value  and  productivity  of  the  farm  assets  by
county.  To  place  the  amount  of  delinquent  agricultural  loans  on  a  relative
basis,  the  amount  of  delinquent  debt  is  divided  by  each  county's  average  farm
I  I<  $4  million
iliE  $20-28  million
\///  $4-$12  million  $1  $12-$20  million
>  $28  million
Estimated  Delinquent  Agricultural  Loan  Volume  By  North  Dakota  Counties,
1986
Figure  1.
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income  from  1982-1984  (Census).  Average  farm  income  by  county  was  used
because  total  debt  statistics  by  North  Dakota  counties  were  unavailable.
Figure  2  illustrates  that  the  ratio  of  delinquent  agricultural  debt  to
agricultural  income  is  the  highest  in  the  oil-producing  counties  of  the
west  central  portion  of  the  state,  the  southeast  corner,  and  several  counties
along  the  southern  edge  of  North  Dakota,  The  high  ratios  in  these  areas  are
likely  due  to  low  income  (several  years  of  adverse  growing  conditions  during
the  1980s)  or  increased  financial  leverage,
One  fourth  of  the  delinquent  agricultural  loans  were  less  than  $37,500;  half
were  less  than  $83,620;  and  90  percent  were  less  than  $292,260  (Figure  3).
Most  of  the  loans  were  secured  by  real  estate  (Figure  4).
Ratio
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Figure  2.  Ratio  of  Delinquent  Agricultural  Loan  Volume  to  Farm  Income  by
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Impact  of  Delayed  Repayment
The  economic  impact  of  delayed  repayment  on  lenders  is  a  combination  of  gross
uncollected  interest  (GUI),  income  received  by  the  credit  institution  (AR),
maintenance  costs  (MAIN),  losses  on  the  sale  of  collateral  due  to  decreased
values,  and  costs  of  negotiated  settlements  (Table  4).  Procedures  for
estimating  each  cost  are  described  in  the  following  paragraphs.  The
estimated  impact  of  delayed  foreclosure  is  explained  first.
TABLE 4.  ECONOMIC  IMPACT  ON CREDITORS  FROM DELAYED  AND PARTIAL  REPAYMENT
BASED  ON  DELINQUENT LOANS  AS  OF  JULY  1, 1986 AND NEGOTIATED  SETTLEMENTS  FROM
JANUARY  1, 1985 TO  JULY  1, 1986
r  million  dollars---
Impact  From  Delayed  Repayment
Before  Acquisitiona
Interest  accrued  22.8
Interest  paid  (.8)
Maintenance  costs  1,9
Loss  on  collateral  value  _d
Total  impact  before  acquisition  23.9
After  Acquisitionb
Loss  of  income  43.0
Rentals  received  (18.1)
Maintenance  costs  3,9
Loss  on  collateral  value  33,4
Total  impact  after  acquisition  62.2
Otherc
Negotiated  settlements  60.4
Impact  from  partial  repayment:
Anti-deficiency  judgment  25.7
Total  economic  impact  of  partial
and  delayed  repayment  172.2
aAverage  loan  delinquency  is  six  months,
bRetained  ownership  for  14  months.
CBased  on  settlements  negotiated  between  January  1,  1985  and  July  1,  1986.
dInconclusive  data.
Impact  of  Delayed  Foreclosure
Gross  uncollected  interest  is  the  amount  of  delinquent  loan  volume  lenders
could  have  collected  multiplied  by  the  average  interest rate  on  the  debt  and
the  duration  of  the  delay.  The  amount  collectible  was  defined  in  a  previous- 25  -
section  to  be  the  lesser  of  (1)  the  outstanding  delinquent  principal  and  (2)
the  proceeds  from  sale  of  the  collateral  adjusted  for  amounts  exempt  from
legal  process.  Collectible  principal  for  each  of  the  2,086  delinquent  loans
was  estimated  from  information  obtained  in  survey  1 as  to  the  likely  proceeds
from  sale  of  securing  property,  unencumbered  assets,  and  exemptions.  These
amounts  were  adjusted  for  missing  values,  summed,  and  expanded  to  the  state
level.  Lenders  could  realistically  collect  $423.5  million  of  the  $466.1
million  loan  volume  delinquent  on  July  1,  1986.
An  average  interest  rate  on  delinquent  debt  of  9.94  percent  was  estimated  by
dividing  interest  paid  on  farm  mortgage  debt  by  the  amount  of  real  estate  debt
outstanding  for  1984,  both  of  which  are  reported  for  North  Dakota  by  USDA.  An
average  interest  rate  of  10.45  percent  also  was  estimated  from  lender's
financial  statements  (Table  5).  However,  commercial  bank  lenders  considered
only  36.5  percent of  their  loan  volume  to  be  agricultural  which  may  impact
their  average  interest  rate.  Therefore,  the  latter  rate  is  not  considered.
The  average  length  of  time  each  loan  was  reported  delinquent  in  survey  1 was
.54  years.  Multiplying  the  amount  lenders  could  collect  ($423.5  million)  by
the  average  interest rate  (9.94%)  and  the  duration  of  delay  (.54  years)  yields
$22.8  million,  which  is  an  estimate  of  gross  uncollected  interest.  However,
3.1% of  the  borrowers  continued  to  make  $0.8 million  in  interest  payments  on
TABLE 5.  CONSOLIDATED  INCOME STATEMENT OF  SURVEYED NORTH  DAKOTA LENDERSa
Revenue  Million  Dollars
Interest  income  359.6
Investment  income  132.5
Fed  funds  income  20.5




Loan  loss  169.9
Other  102.9
Total  643.5
Net  Income  -105.6
Loan  Balance  3442.0
Average  interest  rate  (%)  10.45
aBased  on  lenders'  most  recent  financial  statements.- 26  -
their  delinquent  loans.  Subtracting  this  amount  from  gross  uncollected
interest  results  in  $22.0  million  of  net  uncollected  interest  by  July  1,
1986  for  delinquent  loans  as  of  that  date.
Lenders  also  are  impacted  by  maintenance  costs  and  changes  in  value  of  the
collateral  from  the  time  of  default  until  the  obligation  is  brought  current  or
the  collateral  is  acquired.  As  explained  in  a  preceeding  section,  maintenance
costs  include  insurance,  property  taxes,  and  repairs.  In  survey  1,  lenders
were  asked  to  estimate  annual  maintenance  costs  for  each  delinquent  loan
before  foreclosure.  At  the  state  level,  annual  maintenance  costs  on
collateral  are  calculated  to  be  $3.5  million.  Adjusting  this  estimate  to
reflect  the  .54  years  average  delinquency  reported  as  of  July  1,  1986,  results
in  maintenance  costs  of  $1.9  million  dollars.  Data  to  estimate  the  economic
impact  of  changes  in  the  value  of  the  collateral  were  inconclusive.
Impact  of  Delayed  Liquidation
Loss  of  income  also  arises  because  lenders  are  not  able  to  immediately
liquidate  collateral  after  it  is  acquired  in  satisfaction  of  the
indebtedness.  Loss  of  income  is  estimated  as  the  amount  the  property  will
sell  for  multiplied  by  the  lender's  interest  rate  on  new  loans  and  the  length
of  time  the  property  is  held.  This  procedure  is  similar  to  that  described  in
the  preceding  paragraphs  for  estimating  the  economic  impact  of  delay  before
the  creditor  acquires  the  collateral.  Lenders  report  holding  chattel  for  2
months  and  land  for  14  months  after  acquisition.  Loss  of  income  after
acquisition  was  estimated  as  $43  million.
The  loss  of  income  is  reduced,  however,  to  the  extent  the  lender  derives
income  from  the  property  during  the  ownership  period.  This  income  will
generally  be  rentals.  Although  63.9  percent  of  the  acquired  collateral
generated  some  income  during  the  time  the  creditor  owned  it  (Figure  5),  the
amount  of  income  received  was  equivalent  to  only  42  percent  of  one  year's
rental.  This  occurs  because  property  is  acquired  by  creditors  throughout  the
year--some  of  which  cannot  be  rented  until  the  following  year.  Land  that
is  not  rented  continues  to  tie  up  the  lenders'  capital  in  nonperforming
assets.  The  lack  of  revenue  from  the  nonperforming  assets  reduces  lenders'
income  and  forces  them  to  increase  income  from  other  assets  (i.e.,  interest
rates  on  loans  to  nondelinquent  farm  borrowers).
The  42  percent  of  one  year's  rental  was  calculated  as  a weighted  average  of
lenders'  responses  to  survey  2  (0  = no  income,  .5  = some  income,  and
1 =  more  than  one  years'  income  from  acquired  property).  Lenders  are
estimated  to  receive  $18.1  million  in  rental  revenues  during  the  period  they
own  acquired  collateral.  This  estimate  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  land
rents  equal  interest  on  collateral.  The  cost  to  lenders  of  acquiring  property
that  cannot  be  rented  is  $24.9  million  ($43  million  - $18.1  million).
Lenders,  as  owners  of  the  acquired  property,  are  responsible  for  maintaining
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Figure  5.  Lenders  Reporting  Income  Received  From  Acquired  Property
acquisition  will  accrue  at  the  same  rate  before
which  is  estimated  to  be  $3.5  million  per  year.
reflect  the  average  time  creditors  own  acquired
estimated  maintenance  cost  of  $3.9  million.
the  collateral  is  acquired,
Adjusting  this  amount  to
property  results  in  an
During  the  time  creditors  hold  the  property,  there  is  potential  for  either
appreciation  or  depreciation  of  the  collateral's  value  (Figure  6).  Responses
to  survey  2  suggest  collateral  held  by  lenders  has,  on  average,  decreased  7.1
percent  annually  while  lenders  owned  it.  Considering  a collectible  loan
volume  of  $423.5  million,  the  impact  of  declining  market  values  is
$33.4  million  during  the  approximately  14  months  lenders  own  the  property.
Negotiated  Settlements
The  final  cost  of  repayment  delays  is related  to  negotiated  settlements.
Lenders  may  negotiate  a settlement  for  either  an  ongoing  operation  or  as  part
of  terminating  the  operation  in  order  to  avoid  the  usual  costs  of  foreclosure.
The  amount  of  delinquent  debt  restructured  for  ongoing  operations  in  NorthDown  (86.4%)
Figure 6.  North
1987
Dakota  Lender  Expectations  for  Farmland  Price  Changes  During
Dakota  between  January  1,  1985,  and  July  1,  1986,  was  reported  by  lenders  to  be
$162.1  million.  During  the  same  18-month  period,  lenders  negotiated  on  $179.6
million  of  delinquent  debt  for  purposes  of  termination  (Table  6).  Analysis  of
settlements  by  institution  (after  adjusting  for  size)  show  a positive
correlation  between  size  of  the  institution  and  the  amount  of  loan  volume
negotiated.  The  level  of  negotiation  could  not  be  related  to  the
profitability  of  the  institution.
Terms  of  negotiated  settlements  for  the  period  from  January  1,  1985  to  July
1,  1986  also  were  elicited.  Average  values  shown  were  calculated  by
weighting  each  lenders'  response  by  the  amount  of  debt  they  have  settled,
Thus,  the  responses  of  lenders  who  negotiated  larger  delinquent  loan  volumes
were  counted  more  heavily.
The  cost  to  lenders  of  writing  off  principal  equals  the  volume  of  debt
negotiated  multiplied  by  the  frequency  with  which  principal  is  written  off  and
by  the  amount  of  principal  that  is  typically  written  off.  Lenders  wrote  off
- 28  -
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TABLE  6.  FREQUENCY,  AMOUNT, AND  ECONOMIC  IMPACT OF  NEGOTIATED  SETTLEMENTS ON
DELINQUENT AGRICULTURAL  LOANS  IN NORTH DAKOTA, JANUARY  1, 1985 TO  JULY  1, 1986
Frequency
Volume  of  Amount  Economic
Term  Restructured  Occurrence  Negotiated  Impact
million  million
dollars  ----  percent  -------  dollars
Restructured  for
ongoing  operation:
Principal  written  off  14.71  4.03  1.0
Accrued  interest  written  off  23.50  18.12  .4
Interest  reduction  (basis  pts)  30.81  300  12.1
Additional  collateral  65.70  -. a
Total  162.1  13.5
Settled  for  termination  or
workout  of  operation:
Principal  written  off  59.48  23.42  25.0
Accrued  interest  written  off  59.20  70.92  4.1
Interest  reduction  (basis  pts)  38.03  325  17.9
Additional  collateral  14.97  - a
Total  179.6  47.0
alnconclusive  data.
principal  in  14.7  percent  of  the  settlements  for  ongoing  operations  and  59.5
percent  of  the  settlements  for  terminating  operations.  The  amount  written
off  was  4.03  percent  for  ongoing  operations  and  23.42  percent  for  terminating
operations.  The  cost  to  lenders  of  principal  written  off  through  negotiated
settlements  approximates  $1.0  million  ($162.1  million  x  .1471  x  .0403)  for
ongoing  operations  and  $25.0  million  ($162.1  million  x  .595  x  .2342)  for
terminating  farm  businesses.
Accrued  interest  also  was  written  off  by  lenders  23.5  and  59.2  percent  of  the
time  for  ongoing  and  terminating  operations,  respectively.  Lenders  provided
data  in  survey  1  that  enabled  estimation  of  the  amount  of  outstanding  accrued
interest.  Interest  on  loan  volume  secured  with  real  estate  was,  on  average,
0.55  years  delinquent  and  for  chattel,  0.43  years.  Again  these  average
estimates  were  weighted  according  to  the  magnitude  of  the  delinquent  loan.  The
interest  rate  applied  to  the  loan  volume  was  the  average  USDA  rate  charged  on
all  outstanding  real  estate  debt.
The  cost  to  lenders  of  writing  off  accrued  interest was  calculated  by
multiplying  the  level  of  debt  that  was  settled  through  negotiation  by  the
average  interest rate,  the  average  length  of  delay  weighted  by  the  various- 30  -
types  of  property,  the  frequency  with  which  accrued  interest  was  written  off,
and  the  portion  of  accrued  interest  written  off.  The  cost  to  lenders  of
writing  off  accrued  interest  was  $0.4  and  $4.1 million  for  ongoing  and
terminating  settlements,  respectively.
The  final  cost  of  negotiated  settlements  relates  to  interest  rate  reductions
on  the  remainder  of  the  loan's  life.  The  cost  equals  the  present  value  of  the
difference  between  the  original  rate  and  the  negotiated  rate.  This  is  a  cost
because  it  represents  either  a cash  shortfall  or  an  opportunity  cost  to  the
creditor.  Lenders  expect  to  offer  11.1  percent  and  9.0  percent  interest  on
chattel  and  real  estate  loans,  respectively,  in  1987.  Lenders,  on  average,
reduced  interest  rates  on  restructured  debt  by  300  and  325  basis  points  for
ongoing  and  terminating  operations,  respectively.  For  the  analysis,  it  was
assumed  repayment  periods  for  chattel  and  real  estate  loans  in  North  Dakota
were  5  and  30  years,  respectively.  Further,  it  was  assumed  that  delinquent
borrowers  were  halfway  through  their  repayment  schedule.  Thus,  the  present
value  of  annuity  factor  used  to  capitalize  the  conceded  interest  was  based  on
2.5  and  15  years  depending  on  the  type  of  property  securing  the  loan.
The  cost  to  lenders  of  interest rate  reductions  was  calculated  by  multiplying
the  volume  of  debt  negotiated  by  the  frequency  with  which  lenders  reduced
interest  rates,  the  amount  of  interest  rate  reduction  (basis  points/100),  and
the  present  value  of  the  annuity  factor.  For  ongoing  operations,  lenders
conceded  $12.1  million  of  interest  on  the  outstanding  loan  balance  and  $17.9
million  for  terminating  operations.
Borrowers  provided  additional  collateral  as  part  of  65.7  percent  of  the
negotiated  settlements  for  ongoing  operations.  Additional  collateral  was
provided  in  less  than  15  percent  of  the  settlements  for  terminating
operations.  Creditors  benefit  from  the  additional  collateral  because  their
level  of  security  has  been  increased,  The  survey  data  were  inconclusive,
however,  as  to  the  dollar  impact  of  the  added  security.
Impact  of  Partial  Repayment
The  anti-deficiency  law  primarily  impacts  undersecured  mortgage  holders.  For
each  undersecured  delinquent  loan,  the  value  of  the  collectible  deficiency  was
calculated.  The  lesser  of  this  value  and  the  amount  of  the  debt  was  defined
as  the  impact  of  the  law  which  permits  only  partial  repayment  of  the
delinquent  loan.  The  total  amount  for  all  undersecured  delinquent  loans  is
the  economic  impact  of  the  law  at  the  state  level  and  was  estimated  to  be
$25.7  million  (Table  4).
Other  Impacts
The  previous  section  focused  on  the  impacts  upon  creditors.  This  section
reviews  the  type  of  impact  that  delayed  or  partial  repayment  will  have  on  both
delinquent  and  nondelinquent  borrowers.  Criteria  for  future  agricultural
lending  also  are  discussed  in  this  section.- 31  -
Economic  Impact  on  Delinquent  Borrowers
The  effects  of  delayed  repayment  on  delinquent  borrowers  was  examined  by
projecting  the  financial  situations  for  two  representative  cash  crop  farms  in
North  Dakota  from  1987  to  1990  under  two  scenarios.  The  representative  farms
were  developed  by  Watt,  Johnson,  and  Ali  (1986)  and  are  based  on  annual  farm
business  summaries  compiled  under  the  North  Dakota  Vocational  Agriculture  Farm
Business  Management  Program  (Gullickson  and  Holkup  1984).  The  first  scenario
develops  a  baseline  for  comparison  whereas  the  second  scenario  assumes
interest  and  principal  payments  are  deferred  in  1987.  The  representative
farms  reflect  the  East  Central  and  Red  River  Valley  areas  of  North  Dakota
(Figure  7).  The  financial  structure  of  the  farms  was  adjusted  to  reflect  the
indebtedness  of  the  2,086  delinquent  borrowers  in  survey  1.  Adjustments  also
were  made  in  the  unallocated  production  costs  to  reflect  farm  size  of
delinquent  borrowers.  A simulation  model  developed  by  Schnitkey,  Barry,  and
Ellinger  (1986)  was  used  in  this  study.  This  model  consists  of  a  set  of
computerized  coordinated  financial  statements.
The  East  Central  farm  used  in  the  analysis  involves  2,855  acres  planted  to
wheat  (both  continuous  and  fallow),  barley,  and  sunflowers.  The  Valley  farm
consists  of  1,385  acres  planted  to  wheat  (both  continuous  and  fallow),  barley,
and  sugar  beets.  The  East  Central  farm  rents  1,640  acres  on  a  share  rent  basis
whereas  the  Valley  farm  cash  rents  290  acres  for  $54  per  acre,
Figure  7.  East  Central  and  Red  River  Valley  Areas  of  North  Dakota- 32  -
Crop  production  costs  reflect  averages  of  farmers  in  the  area  (Johnson  et al.
1986)  and  are  assumed  to  increase  by  the  rate  of  inflation  over  the  analysis
period  (Chase  Econometrics  1986).  Interest  rates  on  current,  intermediate-
and  long-term  debt  in  1987  are  based  on  lenders'  expectations  requested  in
survey  2  and  adjusted  in  later  years  based  on  Chase  Econometrics  projections.
Crop  yields  for  the  Valley  farm  are  assumed  to  be  constant  at  45.7  bushels  per
acre  for  continuous  wheat,  47.0  bushels  per  acre  for  wheat  after  fallow,  69.3
bushels  per  acre  for  barley,  and  17  tons  per  acre  for  sugar  beets.  Yields  for
the  East  Central  farm  are  27.0  bushels  per  acre  for  continuous  wheat,  31.8
bushels  per  acre  for  wheat  after  fallow,  49.0  bushels  per  acre  for  barley,  and
10.7  hundredweight  per  acre  for  sunflowers.  Commodity  prices  shown  in  Table  7
are  consensus  estimates  of  researchers  at  midwestern  land  grant  universities
(Barry  1986).  All  farms  are  assumed  to  participate  in  government  farm
programs.  Base  yields  are  assumed  to  equal  production  yields.  Results  from
the  simulation  of  farm  operations  are  shown  in  Table  8  for  the  Valley  farm  and
Table  9  for  the  East  Central  farm.  The  data  clearly  show  that  delinquent
farmers  benefit  from  repayment  delays  if  the  rate  of  return  on  farm  assets  is
greater  than  the  cost  of  debt  and  are  worse  off  if  the  cost  of  debt  exceeds
the  rate  of  return  to  farm  assets.
The  financial  viability  of  the  Valley  farm  improves  over  the  forecast  period
under  both  scenarios.  Substantial  declines  in  net  worth  occur  during  1987-88;
however,  an  improvement  is  shown  in  the  latter  two  years.  Net  income  declines
over  the  period  but  remains  positive  due  chiefly  to  profitable  levels  of
sugar  beet  prices.  As  expected,  the  one-year  deferral  of  principal  and
interest  improves  the  financial  well-being  of  the  firm.
Prospects  for  the  East  Central  farm  are  less  favorable.  Net  income,  net
worth,  and  cashflow  all  deteriorate  over  the  period.  The  primary  difference
between  this  farm  and  the  Valley  farm  is  the  replacement  of  sugar  beets  with
sunflowers  whose  price  is  depressed.  A one-year  deferral  of  interest  and
principal  provides  temporary  relief  during  1987  but  does  not  alter  the  long-
run  prospects  of  the  farm.
TABLE 7.  COMMODITY  PRICES  USED TO  PROJECT FINANCIAL  SITUATIONS  OF NORTH
DAKOTA CASH GRAIN  FARMS
Commodity  1987  1988  1989  1990
Wheat  ($/bu.)  2.61  2.53  2.41  2.41
Barley  ($/bu.)  1.67  1.62  1.64  1.64
Sunflower  ($/cwt.)  8.26  8.47  8o58  8.58
Sugar  beets  ($/ton)  35.78  35.78  35.78  35.78
SOURCE:  Barry,  Peter  J.  1986.  Financial  Stress  in  Agriculture:  Policy  and
Financial  Consequences  for  Farmers.  AE-4621.  Urbana-Champaign:  University
of  Illinois,  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics.- 33  -
TABLE 8.  IMPACT  OF  DEFERRED  INTEREST AND  PRINCIPAL  SCENARIO ON  A RED RIVER
VALLEY  FARM  IN  NORTH  DAKOTA FOR  YEARS  1987 TO  1991
Item
Beginning  net  worth
Ending  net  worth





Return  on  equity
Beginning  net  worth
Ending  net worth












































The  long-run  viability  of  these  farms  is  only  partially  determined  by  capital
costs  and  repayment  rates.  Other  important  factors  are  commodity  prices,
enterprise  selections,  production  costs,  management  skills,  and  public  policy.
Both  of  the  example  farms  benefit  financially  from  a one-year  deferral  of
principal  and  interest.  However,  the  deferral  does  not  alter  the  long-run
prospects  of  each  farm.- 34 -
TABLE  9.  IMPACT  OF  DEFERRED  INTEREST AND  PRINCIPAL  SCENARIO ON  AN  EAST
CENTRAL  NORTH  DAKOTA FARM  FOR YEARS  1987 TO  1991
Item
Beginning  net  worth
Ending  net  worth





Return  on  equity
Beginning  net  worth
Ending  net  worth





Return  on  equity
1987/88  1988/89





































































aEarning  a  negative
return  on  equity.
net  income  from  a  negative  net  worth  is  an  undefined
This  section  summarized  the  economic  impact  a  deferral  or  partial  repayment
has  upon  delinquent  borrowers.  Generally,  delinquent  borrowers  benefit  but
not  sufficiently  to  alter  the  course  of  their  farm  business  in  the  future.
The  next  section  is  a discussion  of  who  shares  the  cost  of  the  adverse  impacts
imposed  upon  creditors.
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Economic  Impact  on  Nondelinquent  Borrowers
The  economic  impact  of  delayed  and  partial  repayment  to  farm  borrowers  who  are
not  delinquent  is  in  the  form  of  higher  average  interest  rates  and  lower
credit availability.  Financial  institutions,  like  other  private  businesses,
operate  for  profit.  To  the  extent  losses  are  incurred,  lenders  must  raise
interest rates  on  their  remaining  loans  in  order  to  cover  expenses  and
administrative  costs  associated  with  foreclosure.
The  survey  elicited  information  on  all  delinquent  loans  as  of  July  1,  1986,
and  negotiated  settlements  since  January  1,  1985.  Even  after  the  data  have
been  annualized  to  adjust  for  differing  time  periods,  it  is  difficult to
estimate  the  magnitude  lenders  have  to  increase  interest  rates  to  their
nondelinquent  borrowers.  The  complication  arises  in  part  because  the  total
economic  impact  consists  of  both  a delayed  collection  of  interest  on  which
borrowers  have  defaulted  and  partial  repayment  of  principal  (loss  of  lenders'
assets).  The  first  impact  is  static  in  nature  whereas  the  second  is  dynamic
since  asset  losses  affect  the  profitability  of  lenders  over  more  than  a  single
period.
The  loan  pricing  model  developed  in  a  previous  section  only  evaluates  static
impacts  arising  from  loan  defaults.  The  model  assumes  lenders  ultimately
collect the  original  loan  principal  and  only  incur  costs  associated  with
collection  delays.  Based  on  the  data  from  Table  5  and  assuming  a  13.5  percent
default  rate,  interest  rates  to  nondelinquent  North  Dakota  farm  borrowers  are
calculated  to  be  146  basis  points  above  the  rate  lenders  could  offer  if  they
did  not  have  loan  defaults.
The  full  economic  impact  (including  both  dynamic  and  static  effects)  can  be
approximated  by  dividing  the  total  economic  impact  of  both  partial  and  delayed
repayment  by  the  level  of  outstanding  agricultural  loan  volume  in  North
Dakota.  This  method  estimated  that  lending  rates  to  farm  borrowers  were
500  basis  points  above  normal  if  all  of  the  additional  costs  associated  with
partial  and  delayed  repayment  of  delinquent  loans  were  passed  on  during  the
period  they  were  incurred.  However,  lenders  more  than  likely  increased  rates
(or  failed  to  lower  rates)  once  indications  of  problem  loans  surfaced.
Lenders  also  may  continue  to  charge  higher  rates  for  a period  of  time  in  the
future  until  their  equity  capital  is  restored.  Therefore,  as  lenders  spread
their  costs  over  more  than  one  year,  the  full  dynamic  impact  on  farm  lending
rates  would  be  less.  For  example,  lending  rates  would  be  143  basis  points
above  normal  each  year  if  lenders  capitalized  the  additional  costs  over  a
period  of  four  years  at  a discount  rate  of  10  percent.  This  simplistic
evaluation  is  deficient  because  the  administrative  costs  associated  with
partial  repayment  are  not  accounted  for.
In  the  future,  lenders  might  increase  interest  rates  to  all  new  farm  borrowers
in  order  to  compensate  themselves  for  loan  losses.  This  form  of  protection  is
likely to  occur  only  if  all  farm  loans  have  an  equal  probability  of  becoming
delinquent.  More  than  likely,  lenders  will  increase  interest  rates  on  loans
to  farmers  who  are  most  likely  to  default.  Computerized  credit-checking
services  may  help  lenders  identify  borrowers  with  a  history  of  loan  defaults.- 36  -
Higher  interest  rates  to  farm  borrowers  is  only  one  consequence  of  delayed  or
partial  repayment.  The  other  consequence  is  in  the  form  of  lower  capital
availability  when  lenders  either  ration  credit  or  curtail  lending  activities.
This  action  occurs  because  lenders  can  only  raise  interest  rates  so  far  before
they  begin  to  lose  market  share,  attract  riskier  customers  (adverse
selection),  and  indirectly alter  the  behavior  of  existing  customers  who  are
forced  to  adopt  riskier  investments.
Higher  interest  rates  may  attract  customers  with  riskier  portfolios  because
these  customers  perceive  the  lender  as  projecting  a  low  probability  of
repayment.  In  other  words,  customers  borrow  at  high  interest  rates  because
they  expect  to  default.  Likewise,  borrowers,  who  have  sound  intentions  of
repaying,  are  induced  to  undertake  riskier  investments  with  lower
probabilities  of  success  but  higher  payoffs  when  successful.  These  borrowers
assume  riskier  investments  or  methods  of  production  in  order  to  pay  higher
prices  for  credit  and  maintain  their  level  of  income  and  standard  of  living.
As  the  variability  of  borrowers'  income  increases,  lenders'  portfolios  are
also  placed  in  increased  jeopardy.
Another  impact  is  a  less  efficient  capital  market.  One  attribute  of  an
efficient  capital  market  is  reliable  access  to  credit when  needed.  Lenders
that  begin  to  ration  credit  reduce  the  overall  capital  availability  and
thereby  hinder  the  market's  efficiency.
Data  to  quantitatively  estimate  these  relationships  were  not elicited  in  the
survey,  but  theory  suggests  that  increased  delinquencies  affect  the  behavior
of  both  existing  and  new  farm  borrowers  in  a  manner  that  reduces  the  overall
availability  of  capital.  This  logic  is  consistent  with  Alston  (1984)  who
estimated  that  new  farm  mortgages  issued  by  private  lenders  declined  by  30
percent  nationwide  after  the  Great  Depression  (1932-34).
Future  Lending  Standards
Lending  standards  will  likely  change  in  the  future  as  a  result  of  the  past
stressful  period.  One  lesson  that  can  be  learned  from  this  period  relates  to
the  deficiencies  of  both  equity  and  cashflow  lending.  Lenders  who  continue  to
originate  loans  simply  because  borrowers  have  "paper  equity"  or  can  meet
scheduled  payments  of  interest  and  principal  will  not  survive.  More  emphasis
must  be  placed  on  the  profitability  of  investments  (from  the  borrowers'
perspective)  in  addition  to  the  timing  of  cash  inflows  and  expenses.  As
prudent  investment  decisions  on  the  part  of  borrowers  increase  their  net
worth,  lenders  will  find  their  financial  base  strengthened.  The  variability
of  commodity  prices  as  well  as  macroeconomic  and  farm  policies  will  likely
continue  to  remain  high  in  the  future.  Lenders  consequently  need  to  increase
their  use  of  sensitivity  analyses  in  order  to  evaluate  the  profitability  and
net  present  value  of  investments  under  a  variety  of  alternative  assumptions
and  price  scenarios.
Farm  operations  that  continue  to  grow  in  response  to  technical  change  will
experience  an  increased  demand  for  capital.  These  demands  may  exceed  the- 37  -
capacity  of  local  and  even  regional  service  centers.  In  addition,  these
borrowers  will  be  very  price  sensitive,  patronizing  lenders  who  extend  the
lowest-priced  credit  regardless  of  other  services  offered.  Due  to  their
capital  requirements,  these  borrowers  will  be  subjected  to  many  of  the  credit
evaluation  standards  nonagricultural  borrowers  already  face.
The  remaining  farmers  will  demand  a  broad  range  of  financial  services  and
borrow  at  premium  rates.  The  additional  cost  of  credit will  have  a  negligible
impact  on  their  farm  business  since  their  relative  amount  of  borrowing  is
small.  For  many  of  these  borrowers,  farming  will  only  be  a  part-time
occupation.  Their  various  activities  will  limit  the  amount  of  time  they  can
expend  shopping  for  low-cost  financial  services,  such  as  insurance  and  tax
preparation.
The  evaluation  of  the  borrower  as  an  individual  will  likely  change  in  the
future  also.  In  the  past,  a  person's  character  was  an  important  factor  in
credit  analysis.  As  financial  institutions  continue  to  increase  in  size,  this
factor  becomes  less  significant  as  more  loans  are  based  on  quantitative
economic  criteria.  However,  an  individual's  management  ability will  likely
become  more  important  in  the  future.  For  example,  the  ability  of  farmers  to
quickly  adopt  new  technology  to  their  own  operations  will  be  a  crucial
determinant  of  firm  survivability especially  as  the  agriculture  sector
continues  to  rapidly  evolve  in  response  to  technical  developments.
Finally,  credit institutions  also  will  respond.  If  laws  adversely  affecting
lenders  are  not  repealed,  specialized  departments  will  be  created  and  staffed
by  persons  knowledgeable  in  maintenance  of  acquired  property  and  negotiated
settlements.  Most  agricultural  lenders  have  little  experience  in  these  areas.
Further,  the  skills  of  loan  officers  will  develop  as  they  become  proficient
users  of  credit  scoring  methods  and  quantitative  judges  of  loan  applications.
Implications  for  Legislation
The  emphasis  of  this  study  has  been  from  a  historical  perspective--
estimating  the  economic  impacts  of  statutory  law  as  of  July  1,  1986.  A
number  of  researchable  issues  require  further  study.  These  are  issues  that
could  not  be  estimated  with  available  data  or  were  new  questions  raised  by  the
study's  findings.  Since  the  prospects  for  a recovery  in  the  farm  sector
remain  unchanged  until  the  next  harvest,  North  Dakota  legislators  will  likely
draft  legislative  proposals  in  1987  to  further  protect  the  rights  of
delinquent  farm  borrowers.  Further,  the  specific  provisions  of  such  proposals
are  unknown  at  the  present,  making  it  difficult  to  estimate  their  economic
impact.  In  this  section,  we  qualitatively  discuss  these  researchable  issues
so  public  policymakers  can  make  the  best  decisions  possible.
This  study  did  not  attempt  to  analyze  the  economic  impact  of  a  law  that
prevents  the  enforcement  of  any  delinquent  debt.  Arguably,  no  borrowers  will
service  their  debt  during  the  effective  period  of  such  a  delay.  At  expiration
of  the  period  of  nonenforcement,  borrowers  that  are  determined  and  capable  of- 38  -
servicing  their  obligations will  likely  do  so,  but  financial  institutions  are
not  likely  to  recover  the  earning  opportunity  that  occurred  during  the  delay.
Proposals  to  permit  a  delay  in  repayment  will  not  benefit  borrowers  if  the
interest  which  accrues  during  the  delay  exceeds  the  amount  of  income  the
borrower  will  earn  by  continuing  to  hold  the  property  for  that  time.  For
example,  a  delay  in  foreclosing  real  estate  mortgages  during  the  winter  months
will  not  assist  farmers  because  a  crop  is  not  growing  on  the  land  even  though
the  interest  on  the  debt  steadily  mounts.  Furthermore,  any  legal  action  to
terminate  the  accrual  of  interest  will  most  likely  be  unconstitutional
(impairment  of  contract).  Similarly,  a  law  delaying  enforcement  of  debt  over
the  duration  of  a  growing  season  must  be  coupled  with  a  payment  of  rent  or
interest that  accrues  during  that  time;  otherwise,  the  effort also  will  fail
to  pass  constitutional  scrutiny  (Home  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Blaisdell,
290  U.S.  398  (1934)).
This  research  effort  did  not  include  an  attempt  to  estimate  the  magnitude  nor
the  impact  of  borrowers  who  deliberately  default  on  land  payments.  Persons
owing  debt  in  excess  of  the  land's  current  value  can  force  the  financial
institution  to  "buy"  the  land  for  the  amount  of  the  debt.  This  is
accomplished  by  intentionally  defaulting  knowing  that  (1)  the  foreclosure
process  and  redemption  period  will  permit  the  borrower  to  farm  the  land  at
least  one  more  crop  season  and  (2)  the  "anti-deficiency  judgment  law"  will
prevent  the  creditor  from  reaching  any  other  equity  the  borrower  may  possess.
Any  attempts  to  further  restrict  the  amount  a  borrower  must  pay  to  fulfill  an
existing  obligation  will  violate  the  Constitution  by  impairing  existing
contracts.  Those  efforts  can  only  arise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  bankruptcy
as  mandated  by  the  federal  Constitution.
The  costs  of  a  deferral  are  borne  entirely  by  lenders  and  other  patrons  of  the
financial  institution.  But,  both  of  these  parties  also  are  experiencing
financial  difficulty  at  the  present  time.  Therefore,  policymakers  should
consider  transferring  some  or  all  of  the  cost  of  supporting  delinquent
borrowers  to  the  public  sector  rather  than  forcing  lenders  and  the  remaining
farm  borrowers,  who  may  be  on  the  verge  of  financial  difficulty  themselves,  to
solely  bear  these  costs.  These  issues  and  others  continue  to  warrant  further
research  and  thorough  analysis.Appendix  A
"Confiscatory  Price  Statute"
North  Dakota  Century  Code  28-29- 41  -
North  Dakota's  "Confiscatory  Price  Statute"
N.D.  Cent.  Code  28-29-04.  Power  of  courts  when  prices  are  confiscatory.--
Until  the  price  of  farm  products  produced  in  this  state  shall  rise  to  a  point
to  equal  at  least  the  cost  of  production,  in  comparison  with  the  price  of
other  commodities  in  general,  entering  into  the  business  of  agriculture,  the
supreme  court  of  this  state  and  all  district  and  county  courts  in  this  state
shall  have  power,  when  it  is  deemed  for  the  best  interests  of  litigants,  to
extend  the  time  for  serving  and  filing  all  papers  requisite  and  necessary  for
the  final  determination  of  any  cause.  Any  such  court,  in  like  manner,  may
stay  the  entry  of  judgment  or  the  issuance  of  execution  thereon,  or  may  defer
the  signing  of  any  order  for  judgment,  or  may  defer  terms  of  court,  whenever
in  the  judgment  of  the  court  the  strictly  legal  procedure  in  any  cause  will
confiscate  or  tend  to  confiscate  the  property  of  any  litigant  by  forcing  the
sale  of  agricultural  products  upon  a  ruinous  market.
28-29-05.  Courts  may  delay  orders  in  foreclosures.--Whenever  any  foreclosure
proceeding  is  pending  in  any  court  in  this  state  and  the  amount  of  debt  is
less  than  the  value  of  the  property  involved,  and  when  any  order  for  judgment
will  have  the  force  and  effect  of  depriving  a  defendant  of  his  home  and
confiscating  his  property,  the  court  may  construe  further  proceedings  to  be
unconscionable,  and  may  delay  the  signing  of  such  order  to  such  time  as  it
shall  deem  it  advisable  and  just  to  enter  the  same.
28-29-06.  Public  policy.--Any  court  mentioned  in  section  28-29-04  may  take
judicial  notice  of  the  situation  of  producers  and  laborers  when  prices  of  farm
products  are  confiscatory,  and  upon  the  ground  of  public  policy  may  do  all
things  necessary  to  be  done  lawfully  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  sections
28-29-04  and  28-29-05.Appendix  B
Survey  1- 45  -
1986  Agricultural  Creditors  Survey
Department  of Agricultural  Economics
North Dakota State University
North Dakota has  several  statutes defining  rights  and  limitations of
credit  institutions  after default by  a  debtor.  Two  such  laws  are  the
anti-deficiency judgment  statute which  limits  deficiency judgments after
foreclosure of  a  real  estate mortgage  and  the confiscatory price  law which
grants  the  state courts  additional  discretionary authority to  delay  legal
proceedings such  as  foreclosure.  A  study is  being  conducted to  determine
the economic  impact  on  agricultural  creditors and  borrowers of  statutes
which  permit  delayed or  partial  repayment  of  loans.  A  secondary  objective
is  to  investigate  the effects  of  the  statutes  on  availability of  credit  and
its  cost in  the  future.
Two types  of  information  are requested,  and,  for your convenience,
two  survey instruments  have been developed.  The first  survey requests
specific  information  about  each  delinquent  loan in  order to  better
understand  the  state of  agricultural  debt currently in  default.  The  second
survey solicits  general  information  about your financial  institution's
capital  structure, operating costs,  and  lending policies.  Any information
provided to  the  Department of Agricultural  Economics  will  be  strictly
confidential  and  only summaries of  the  collected data will  be  published.
Some  financial  institutions  may find  it  more convenient  to  provide
the data  by means  of a  computer.  Please contact  the Department of
Agricultural  Economics if  you are  interested  in  an  electronic transfer of
information.  The  departmental  phone  number is  237-7441,  and  the principal
investigators are  Dr.  Cole R.  Gustafson and David M.  Saxowsky.
Please  read  all  instructions  and  questions carefully.  If  you  have
any questions while  answering these  surveys, please contact either
principal  investigator.
Please return completed surveys  by Wednesday, October  15,  1986.- 46  -
SURV/EY  1
Loans  Currently  Oelinquent
Please  provide  the  following  information  for  each  delinquent  loan  used  for
agricultural  purposes  in  North  Oakota  (regardless  of  collateral)  that  your
institution  had  as  of  July  1,  1986,  or  a  later  date  if  it  is  more  convenient  in
completing  the  survey.  Only  two  delinquent  loans  can  be  reported  per  sheet;
therefore,  enclosed  are  several  copies  of  Survey  1.  Please  make  additional
copies  as  necessary  to  report  all  delinquent  agricultural  loans.
Loan 1
1. What is  the principal  amount
of  this  delinquent loan? $
Loan  2
$
2.  Is  the  debtor  current  on
interest  payments  for  this
loan?  (circle  one)  Y
3.  What  is  the  total  amount  of
delinquent  principal  and
interest?
4. How many months  has this  loan
been  in  default?
5. What is  the  type  of  property
securing  this  loan?
(check  one)
6.  Does this  loan  impose a mortgage
on  the debtor's homestead?
(circle  one)
7. What is  likely to  be  the  amount
of proceeds  from sale  of real
estate securing the  loan,  net
of  selling costs  and  settlement
of  priority claims?
8. What is  likely  to  be  the  amount
of  proceeds  from sale of  chattel
property securing the  loan,  net
of  selling costs and  settlement
of  priority claims?
9. In  which  county (or  counties)
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Loan  I
10.  What  are  the  annual  maintenance
costs  incurred by your firm on
this collateral  (for example,
insurance  and  advanced or  unpaid
property taxes  or  real  estate)?  $
11.  Has  your  firm  initiated  a legal
procedure  to  enforce  the
security  interest  or  mortgage




Answer Questions  12  to  18  based on  the  last creditor-acceoted  balance sheet  you
have for  the  debtor.
Loan  1
12.  What is  the total  value of
the debtor's  current assets
(cash,  livestock  for sale,
stored grains,  inventories)?
13.  What is  the  total  value of
the debtor's  intermediate
assets  (equipment,  machinery,
breeding  livestock)?
14.  What  is  the  total  value  of
the  debtor's  long-term
assets  (land,  buildings)?
15.  What  is  the  total  amount  of
the  debtor's  current
liabilities  (payable  within
one year)?
16.  What  is  the total  amount of
the debtor's  intermediate
liabilities  (payable in  one
to  ten  years)?
17.  What is  the  total  amount of
the  debtor's  long-term
liabilities (payable  in  more
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18.  What is  the  date  of  this financial
information?  (month and year;
example:  December 1985)
END  OF  SURVEY  1;
PLEASE  CONTINUE  AND  COMPLETE  SURVEY  2.Apendix  C
Survey  2- 51  -
SURVEY 2
Information About  the Financial  Institution
A.  Information on'Acquired Property
1. What is  the  number of  months your firm typically has  owned chattel  after
acquiring it  at  a  foreclosure sale or  by means of a  voluntary deed?
months
2. What  is  the  number of months your firm typically has owned land  after
acquiring it  after a  redemption period or by means  of  a  voluntary deed?
months
3. During the  period of  ownership  after  the redemption  period, what is  the
annual  gross  income your firm typically receives from the  land?  (check  one)
no  income
_some-  income but  less  than  the equivalent of  one year's rent
equivalent of one or more year's  rent
other  (specify)___  ___
4. This  question  asks  you to  recall  those delinquent agricultural  loans your
firm had  since January 1985  but  that are no  longer outstanding because the
borrower  paid the  debt,  refinanced with  another  lender,  or liquidated  the
farm.  What  percent  of  the dollar amount of  these former  loans  typically
was  recovered?
%
B. Financial  Characteristics
5. Please attach  to  this  survey form a  copy of your institution's financial
statements (income  statement  and balance sheet)  for  the most recent fiscal
year.  If  your firm is  a  subsidiary of a  larger institution, please  provide
the  requested  data for your credit  unit only.  Please"  include both
agricultural  and  nonagricultural  credit operations.








7.  What percent  of  total  loan volume  (total  mature  and  unmatured principal)
is  delinquent  at  this  time?  %
8.  What percent  of your  loan  volume (total  mature  and  unmatured principal)  is
for  agricultural  purposes?  %
9. What percent  of  your agricultural  loan  volume  (total  mature and  unmatured
principal)  is delinquent  at  this  time?  %- 52  -
SURVEY  2  (CONT.)
C. Negotiations with  Delinquent Borrowers
Often a  financial  institution  negotiates a  settlement  with a  delinquent
borrower in  order to  avoid  the  cost  and delay of  initiating a  legal
proceeding  such  as foreclosure.  The  terms  of  settlement may vary
depending on  whether the purpose is  to  restructure  the  debt  of  an  ongoing
operation or settle  the obligations of a  farm ceasing operation.  Please
answer the  portions  of the  following questions that  are  relevant to  your








10.  What is  the dollar  volume (total  mature
and unmatured  principal)  of  agricultural
loans  that your  institution has  negotiated
a  settlement on  since January 1985  in
order to  prevent or  correct  a delinquency?
If  your answer to  Question 10  is  NONE,  skip
and  go  to  Section D.
$ $








10a.  What percent  of  these  settlements  involved
a  write-down of  principal?  If  zero,  SKIP
Question  lOb.
lOb.  What portion  of  the principal  was  typically
written  off?
lOc.  What percent  of  these  settlements involved
a  write-down of  accrued  interest?
If  zero,  SKIP  Question lOd.
lOd.  What portion  of  the  accrued interest  was
typically written  off?
10e.  What percent  of  these  settlements  involved
reducing the  interest rate  for remaining
term?  If  zero,  SKIP  Question 10f.
1Of.  What was  the  typical  reduction  in  the
interest  rate?
lOg.  What percent  of  these  settlements  involved
extending  the repayment period?  If  zero,
SKIP  Question  10h.
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SURVEY  2  (CONT.)
1Oh.  How much  time was  typically added  to  the
repayment period?  (Answer in  terms of












10i.  What percent  of  these  settlements  involved
the  borrower providing additional  collateral
to  secure  the  loan?  If  zero,  SKIP
Question 10j.  %
10j.  After additional  collateral  is  provided,
what  percent  of  the  renegotiated  loan  was
typically considered secured?  %
D. Policies  and Attitudes
Questions  11  to  14  ask you to  look  to  the future by thinking  about the remainder of  1986  and  1987.  Please  answer these questions  based  on  your








11.  What is  the dollar volume  (total  mature and
unmatured  principal)  of  agricultural  loans  that
your  institution  expects  to  negotiate  a
settlement on  during  the  remainder of  1986  and
the first  six months of  1987 in  order to
prevent  or correct a  delinquency? $ $
12.  What percent  of  your  agricultural  loan  volume do  you  expect  to  become
delinquent  for  the first  time  during the  remainder of  1986  and  the  first
six  months  of  1987?
13.  What  lending  rates  do you expect to  offer for agricultural  loans  during
the  remainder of  1986  and  the first  six months of  1987, or check the
appropriate  blank if  you do  not  offer a  type  of  financing:
operating  loans
chattel  loans
real  estate loans
Do  not  offer  operating  loans
Do  not  offer  chattel  loans
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SURVEY  2 (CONT.)
14.  What change in  land  values do  you expect during  1987  (check  one and




decrease  by  percent
will  not  change
increase  by  percent
15.  You  have finished  the  surveys  and  we thank  you for your cooperation.  May








The  completed surveys,  and
a  copy of your  institution's financial  statements  (as requested in
Question  5)  to  the  address below.  Due  to  the various  size of  annual
reports, we  request  that you furnish  the envelope  and  postage;  we  also
suggest  that you  clip and  use the  bottom portion of  this page  as  a  mailing
label,
Department of  Agricultural  Economics
Survey of Ag  Creditors
Box  5636
North Dakota State University
Fargo,  ND  58105Appendix D
Follow-up  Telephone Survey- 57
Follow-up Phone  Survey of Banks
1. What percent  of your  loan  volume  (total  mature  and  unmatured principal)  is
for  agricultural  purposes?  %
2. What percent  of  total  loan  volume  (total  mature  and  unmatured principal)
is delinquent  at  this  time?  %
3. What  percent of your agricultural  loan  volume (total  mature  and  unmatured
principal)  is  delinquent at  this  time?  %
Often a  financial  institution  negotiates a  settlement  with a  delinquent
borrower in  order to  avoid the  cost  and  delay of  initiating a  legal








4.  What  is  the  dollar volume (total  mature
and  unmatured principal)  of  agricultural
loans  that your institution  has  negotiated
a  settlement on  since January 1985 in
order to  prevent  or correct a  delinquency?
If  your  answer to Question 4  is  NONE,  skip
and  go to  Question 5,
$ $








4a.  What  percent of  these settlements  involved
a  write-down  of  principal?  If  zero,  SKIP
Question 4b.
4b.  What  portion of  the principal  was typically
written off?
4c.  What  percent  of  these settlements  involved
a  write-down of  accrued  interest?
If  zero,  SKIP Question 4d.
4d.  What  portion  of the  accrued  interest was
typically written off?
4e.  What  percent of  these  settlements  involved
reducing the  interest  rate for  remaining







4f.  What was  the  typical  reduction  in  the
interest rate?
4g.  What percent  of  these settlements  involved
extending  the repayment  period?  If  zero,
SKIP Question 4h.
4h.  How much  time was typically added  to the
repayment  period?  (Answer in  terms of





4i,  What percent of  these settlements  involved
the borrower  providing additional  collateral
to  secure  the  loan?  If  zero,  SKIP
Question 4j.  %  %
4j.  After additional  collateral  is  provided,
what percent of  the renegotiated  loan was
typically considered secured?  %  %
The  last  two questions  ask you  to  look  to  the future by thinking about  the
remainder of  1986  and 1987.  Please  answer these questions  based  on your








5o  What  is  the dollar volume  (total  mature  and
unmatured  principal)  of  agricultural  loans  that
your  institution expects  to negotiate a
settlement  on  during  the remainder of  1986  and
the  first six  months of 1987  in  order.to
prevent or  correct a  delinquency? $
6. What percent of  your agricultural  loan  volume do you expect to
delinquent  for the first  time during the remainder of  1986  and




You  have finished  the  survey and  we  thank you  for your cooperation.
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